

THE RICE INSTITUTE PAMPHLET



PUBLIC ADDRESSES

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E. HARRIS HARBISON

A TELESCOPIC VIEW OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

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TRENTON WILLIAM WANN

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THE INTELLECTUAL AS SOCIAL REFORMER: MACHIARELLI AND THOMAS MORE*

MY SUBJECT in these lectures is the intellectual as social reformer, with particular reference to two sixteenth-century figures.

We may do well to start with the simple fact that the intellectual is almost inevitably a reformer. If a man sets himself to ponder hard and long about some big problem—such as the nature of God or of man or of society or of the universe—if he honestly tries to take all the relevant facts into account and to develop an intelligible theory about his problem, as a good intellectual does, then he is going to become dissatisfied with what he finds. If it is God and the universe that interest him, he may have to limit himself to criticizing other people's *theories*. But if it is man and society, he will be tempted to point out a few actual things that are wrong, why they are wrong, and how they can be remedied. Seeing things whole generally has this effect. No sooner does Mr. Toynbee get well into his vast *Study of History*, for instance, than we realize that he is pointing out quite a few things that are wrong with our Western society and calling on us to mend our ways.

At the dawn of the modern era, two supremely articulate figures happened to exemplify most of the significant problems of the intellectual as social reformer: his strengths and weaknesses, how he comes by his ideas, what gives him his social passion, and what lends his work enduring quality. They were Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas More. Their lives and writings are perfectly familiar to educated people,

* Two lectures prepared for delivery in April, 1957. Because of Professor Harbison's illness at the time scheduled for the lectures, they were not given. They are printed here as prepared for oral presentation.

and I do not expect to tell you any facts about either that you do not already know. What I propose to do is to look at them from a somewhat fresh perspective: as pioneers of the idea that society—not individuals alone—can be changed, and that for various good and sufficient reasons, it must be. The fact is that Machiavelli and More inaugurated modern political thinking by sensing and facing what proved to be some of the most crucial problems of our modern Western society. Neither had much influence on the technical political theory of his day. But between them they gave us two words which have absorbed a heavy freight of meaning in the intervening centuries: “Machiavellian” and “Utopian.” And this is one measure of their stature and importance, even if Machiavelli was no “Machiavellian” and More no “Utopian”—as they were not. Together they represent the first tough-minded but imaginative thinking about modern political, social, and economic problems. And together they symbolize the perennial tension between the two polar attitudes on these problems: that of the “realist” and that of the “moralist.”

It was worth recalling some of the main contrasts and coincidences between the two before we go further. Europe was culturally and spiritually more united in 1500 than it is today, but there were sharp contrasts between Machiavelli's Italy, with its welter of wealthy independent cities, and More's England, one of the better-run national monarchies of its day. Machiavelli was born in Florence in 1469; Thomas More in London nine years later. They never met nor (so far as we know) ever read each other's works. Machiavelli spent his younger years in active civil service, his later years in bitter enforced retirement. More spent his early years in private life and long resisted the call to service of his King, which he

entered in his later years. Machiavelli was driven to write by being dismissed from office, More (in part) by being invited to assume office. Machiavelli wrote his major works in Italian for the perusal of a few and never published them during his lifetime; More wrote his most famous book in Latin and published it immediately to the delight of the learned all over Europe. They wrote simultaneously. Machiavelli dedicated his final version of *The Prince* to Lorenzo de' Medici in 1516, the same year More's *Utopia* came off the presses at Louvain. Machiavelli was a thorough pagan who nevertheless never formally rejected Christianity, saw his son enter the priesthood, and died with a priest at his bedside. More was one of the great Christians of history, who nevertheless remained a layman all his life and is remembered today as much for his more worldly qualities as for his sainthood—his humor, his family life, his zest for classical learning, and his shrewd grasp of social problems. Machiavelli died a disappointed man in 1527, before word could reach him that another man had been given the public office he had long coveted. More died triumphantly on the scaffold in 1535, "the King's good servant," as he put it, "but God's first."

Polar opposites, you may conclude—and there is much truth in this. But it is important not to forget what they had in common. Each of them represented a combination, not too common even in the Renaissance, of scholarly tastes and practical experience, of humanistic accomplishment and civil service. Each was a thorough humanist in the contemporary sense of the word; that is, one who is convinced of the importance and relevance of classical study and who devotes much of his time to it. At the same time, each was saved from the dilettantism of many contemporary humanists by his strong practical interests. Both believed in the efficacy of

appealing to men's intelligence, but neither believed that an intellectual could change the world merely by writing books. Both wrote with exceptional clarity, and yet both managed to set their readers to arguing violently about what they *really* meant to say. The major conclusion of these arguments, which are now over four centuries old, seems to me to be this: that Machiavelli was a curiously idealistic realist, and that More was a strikingly realistic idealist. Polar opposites with much in common, in other words.

I. MACHIAVELLI

It is hard to describe the conditions surrounding the birth of modern political thought at the close of the Middle Ages without grossly distorting the picture by oversimplification. Perhaps the most direct way is to say that the political thought of the brilliant generation that included Machiavelli and More was the result of two things: the social tensions accompanying the dissolution of medieval institutions, and the simultaneous impact of the classical revival.

At the close of the fifteenth century the medieval *respublica christiana* was disintegrating rapidly. The pattern was still there in men's minds, the pattern of a hierarchical society headed in its temporal aspects by the Emperor and in its spiritual aspects by the Pope. Most men still assumed that this pattern of feudal and ecclesiastical organization was God's design for Christendom. But the discrepancies between the form and the reality were growing at a bewildering pace. In parts of Europe—North Italy, for example—economic power lay in fact with a class which had no place in the pattern, the "middle class" of merchants, industrialists, lawyers, and scholars. Political power rested in an institution utterly unknown to the medieval pattern, the sovereign, ter-

territorial state. Within the busy, swarming cities of Italy there were careers wide open to talent—and hot competition to excel, whether as scholar or artist, professional soldier or political despot. And between the city-states there was a constant jockeying for territory and *Lebensraum*, a struggle for power untempered by any respect for higher authority of Pope or Emperor. Respect for legitimate authority, for what Burke would later call “precedent, prescription, and antiquity,” was still dominant in much of Europe. But in Italy it yielded to admiration for talent and determination, inventiveness and virtuosity. In Burckhardt’s famous phrase, the state was becoming “a work of art,” not something given by God or rooted in immemorial custom and tradition, but something man could mould and shape and form to suit his needs. In fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Florence, revolutions seemed to be the chief outdoor sport, and constitution-making the chief indoor amusement. Diplomacy too became an “art,” the product “of conscious reflection and calculation,” as did warfare and painting and business practice. It has often been remarked that in all this, Italy was a kind of microcosm of the modern world.

In other words, something like the modern sovereign, territorial state and something like modern capitalistic practice in commerce, industry, and even agriculture had appeared in the Europe of 1500. But there were no categories of thought through which these developments could be understood, let alone controlled. The Middle Ages had an unshakable sense of right and justice, but never any very effective way of enforcing the right. There was always a principle to cover every incident, a law to apply to every case, but there were no effective sanctions. The typical early medieval society, someone has said, was “all law and no

government." Now here were strong rulers and powerful merchants creating a kind of illegitimate order of their own. Was it enough simply to put them down as "tyrants" and "despots," "monopolists" and "usurers," using the traditional categories of thought? "The old order was not good," Machiavelli wrote, "and none of us have known how to find a new."¹ He was speaking of the art of war, but the remark might serve as a symbol of the bewilderment of the thinkers of his generation as they searched for some new way of understanding what was going on around them.

Our twentieth-century attitude in such a situation, I suppose, would be to say: "Get our economists and political scientists on the problem; hire a staff, apply for a foundation grant, and rent an electronic calculator; if the money holds out, we should have the answers in a few years." Fortunately or unfortunately, there were no such methods or resources available in the generation of Machiavelli and More. What *was* available was a new store of ancient political and social wisdom, and to this they turned with eagerness. Men began to reread Aristotle and Cicero, Thucydides and Polybius, Livy and Tacitus, with new purpose and understanding. Here was a literature concerned with politics and morals, with civil and foreign war, with tyranny and revolution, with justice and might—in other words, with every aspect of the struggle for power, among individuals within the state and among states themselves. To thoughtful fifteenth-century readers all this was exciting—far more relevant than medieval chronicle or scholastic philosophy—and of course more practical than a "scientific method" still in its infancy. Their contemporary experience enabled them to understand the ancient writers, as schoolmen two centuries earlier could not have done; and their reading in turn deepened their

understanding of contemporary politics and diplomacy. Modern political thought, in other words, resulted from the *coincidence* of rapid social change with the classical revival at the close of the Middle Ages. As new economic and political practices came into almost intolerable conflict with older habits of thought, a relatively untapped storehouse of social insight was discovered, or rediscovered. *The Prince*, *The Discourses on Livy*, and *Utopia* were not the only products of this fruitful coincidence, but they were perhaps the greatest.

So far we have talked in very general and abstract terms. We have left out the factor which, to men of the Renaissance at least, was always the most important: the human factor. Unless these social tensions and political problems somehow got under one man's skin, unless the man concerned was endowed with more than the usual perspicacity and sensitivity, and unless something happened to set this man writing, nothing so grandiose as "the birth of modern political thinking" would take place, of course. Therefore it is very relevant to our inquiry to ask what sort of character and experience Machiavelli brought to his writing, and how he came to write as he did.

The two most prominent traits in his character appear very early: his carefully-nurtured habit of seeing things as they are rather than as they might be, and his contradictory passion to see his beloved city of Florence in the ideal state of civic peace and diplomatic security which he hoped might be, but which obviously did not exist in the 1490's. One of the earliest glimpses we get of him is in a letter he wrote to a friend in March, 1497, describing Savonarola's sermons. Machiavelli saw that the prophet's public addresses were becoming more hysterical as fear for his own power

grew. "He began," writes the cool young observer, "with terrifying horrors, showing with arguments that must have been very effective with people not trained to thinking, that his followers were very fine people while his opponents were the worst sort of rascals. He went on to any limit that seemed likely to weaken the hostile party and strengthen his own." There were two armies, Savonarola argued: that of the Lord, which included him and his own followers, and that of Satan, which was composed, of course, of his enemies.² Savonarola, the "unarmed prophet" of *The Prince*, obviously made a deep impression on Machiavelli, but not as a model of intelligence or statesmanship.

A month after Savonarola's execution, in June, 1498, Machiavelli got his first job with the republican government of Florence, and for the next fourteen years he served as Chancellor and Secretary to the ruling council of the city and as diplomatic envoy on numerous legations—to Paris, to the Emperor, to the Pope, to Caesar Borgia, and to many of the neighboring city-states. The picture we get of him during these years is that of an exceptionally acute observer of the political scene, unquestioningly faithful to his government although sometimes critical of its policies, always conscious of the weakness of the city-state he represents, always anxious to compensate by sheer intelligence for this weakness by turning up ingenious solutions to unsolvable problems, yet usually aware of the grim limits on Florentine freedom of action. He is generally second-in-command on any given legation, not first—which suggests that his bosses valued his brains above his judgment. Occasionally he compares someone's policy with that of the Roman Republic in similar circumstances, to the advantage of the ancients, which suggests that although he is not a man of wide culture, he is reading the ancient historians.

His two constant preoccupations are the disunity at home and the weakness abroad that make his government's job the nightmare that it is. The Pazzi Conspiracy of 1478, that lurid plot to murder Lorenzo the Magnificent in church, had made a deep impression on him at the age of nine, and all his life he was to be concerned with the problem of *parte*, or factions, and their disintegrating effect on the State. But an even deeper impression had been left on him by the invasion of Italy in 1494 by Charles VIII of France, the invasion that first revealed the startling inferiority of a land of petty, warring city-states to a well-organized national monarchy.³ Five more times Italy was to be invaded before Machiavelli's government fell—once more by France, twice by the Emperor, and twice by Spain. The last attack by Spain in 1512 overthrew the republican regime in Florence and restored the Medici to power. In her weakness Florence had made an alliance with France, and in a stubborn display of civic honor, she stuck by the alliance long after it was clear that Spain was going to beat France out for control of the Italian peninsula. In another display of personal honor, Machiavelli's close friend and superior, Piero Soderini, refused to use unconstitutional means to save himself and his government in the crisis. In August, 1512, Soderini fled. Some two months later Machiavelli was dismissed from office. Two months after this, a plot to destroy the new Medici rulers was discovered, Machiavelli's name was found on a list of those to be approached, and Machiavelli himself was imprisoned and tortured to reveal what he knew. Released in February, 1513, he retired to a house of his in the country ten miles south of the city, at Sant' Andrea, where he had a tantalizing glimpse of the Duomo from his garden. And here he was left to put together the broken pieces of his life as well as he could, with a wife and four children to

support, no job, and no visible prospects of getting one.

His letters during this crucial year 1513 to his friend Vettori (who was Florentine ambassador at Rome) and to Soderini (who had fled to Dalmatia) give fascinating glimpses of how a disappointed civil servant of a third-rate republic became the first modern analyst of political power. He was bored, frustrated, and resentful, worried about where the next meal was coming from, and acutely homesick for the world of politics and diplomacy which was his life's blood. Occasionally he would visit the city, but since he was on the outside looking in, this was almost worse than staying in the country. There he would leave the house in the mornings and try to kill time by chatting with his wood-cutters for a while. He would have a book under his arm—Dante, Petrarch, or Ovid—and for a while he would read. Then he would walk down to the local tavern, talking eagerly to everyone he'd meet on the way, "asking news of their towns, and listening to all sorts of stories as throwing light on the varying tastes and whims of men," he says. Then home for dinner at noon, then back to the tavern, where he would play cards with a butcher, a miller, and a couple of bakers the rest of the day. The stakes were small, but the emotion ran high—"just one battle after another with boundless rages and personal insults." "So with these lice clinging to my person," he writes, "I keep my brain dusted off somewhat and provide a vent for the cruelty of my lot," hoping the Fates would soon feel ashamed of themselves for what they had done to him.⁴

He knew perfectly clearly that he was fitted for one career and one only. At forty-three he could not become a merchant or farmer overnight. If only he could talk to Vettori, he writes. "Fortune has so devised that since I cannot talk

of the silk trade or the wool trade or of profit and loss, I have to talk of politics. I have only one choice: either to talk of politics or to take a vow of silence.”⁵ His mind runs restlessly over recent events—every state breaking treaties but Florence, every statesman forgetting the ordinary rules of morality but Soderini with his constitutional scruples. He has come to the conclusion, he writes Soderini, that the sole criterion of policies should be their *results*, not the means used to attain them. The same end can be attained by different means, just as you can get to the same place by different roads. “Just *why* different procedures should now help and now hinder, I do not know,” he writes, “*but I would like to know.*” He suggests the answer is that “times and circumstances” change, and that the means suitable for one time are disastrous for another.⁶ Vettori asks him what he thinks of the latest move of Ferdinand, King of Spain. Isn’t it foolish? Machiavelli jumps at the chance to put his rusting intellect to work and writes ten pages in reply. There is really no problem, he says, if you see that Ferdinand is not much of a statesman—just lucky. His letter will seem a jumble, he concludes apologetically, but he is in the country, never sees a human face (Machiavelli was always given to exaggeration), and knows “nothing of what is going on in the world.”⁷ Later he argues that Vettori overrates Venetian power; the real danger to Italy comes from the Swiss and the French. “I don’t know just what Aristotle says about countries that have been destroyed. What interests me more than theory is *what is, what has been, and what may reasonably happen.*”⁸

Then in the most famous letter he ever wrote (10 December 1513)⁹ Machiavelli tells Vettori how when evening comes, he is in the habit of putting off his soiled clothes,

putting on his court dress, and spending four hours of uninterrupted bliss in the company of his favorite classical authors. With them he partakes of that food which alone he can call his own and for which he was born, he says. He asks them questions, and they answer. Since Dante says there is no knowing apart from remembering, he has put down on paper some of the things he has learned from these older and wiser minds. "I have written a pamphlet which I am calling *On Principalities*. In it I go as deeply as I can into the subject, discussing the definition of monarchy, how many kinds of monarchies there are, and how they are won, held, and lost. . . . Any head of a state, and especially a new one, should find it interesting." He explains frankly that he is dedicating it to Giuliano de' Medici because he desperately needs a job and hopes the Medici will give him one. "Anybody, it seems to me, should be glad to have the services of a man who has acquired so much experience at the expense of other employers. Of my trustworthiness there could be no doubt. Having so long kept faith with people, I would not be likely to begin betraying now. A man who has kept his word loyally for forty-three years, as I have, could not change his nature very easily. The fact that I am a poor man is proof of my loyalty and honor." Four times the word *fede* (faith) occurs in these last sentences.¹⁰ Obviously the writer is deeply concerned to impress even on his friend, who must know it, that patriotism and his pledged word come before party loyalty with him.

This then was the origin of *The Prince*. Perhaps it is evident from this account why those who have read the book over the years have argued—and still argue violently—over its purpose and meaning. Was it simply a cool, disillusioned analysis of how to get and hold on to power, with

the last patriotic chapter added as a sort of afterthought to give the analysis some respectable use? Or did it, on the contrary, all lead up to the last chapter? Was it an honest and passionate appeal to the Medici to become the saviors of Italy from the foreign barbarians? Did the author really mean what he said about playing the beast rather than the man, seeming to have the private virtues but not being hampered by them, breaking faith if it was to your advantage? Was this the Machiavelli who was so proud of his own word once given and of his republic's reputation for good faith? Was he perhaps being satiric in *The Prince*, showing up despotism for what it really was so that all the people could take warning? Or was he even trying to trap the young Medici into following his precepts and thus getting themselves thrown out of Florence by an outraged populace, so that Machiavelli's republican party could get back in? Was he thoroughly immoral in what he said—or simply amoral—or was he sketching a new sort of morality—or was he beneath it all as thoroughly moral as any medieval schoolman, but simply disillusioned with the way things actually were in his day?¹¹

I know you will expect me to answer these questions with some nice neat formula, but I cannot. Nor do I know anyone that can. All of these theories about the meaning of Machiavelli's *Prince* were broached before the sixteenth-century came to a close, and all of them are in one way or another still alive today. Very recent research, however, has opened up some exciting new perspectives on the development of Machiavelli's thought after 1513, and I think it is possible to report a common-sense view of the significance of Machiavelli's thought that represents a sort of scholarly consensus.¹²

The Prince was written at white-hot speed in the fall of 1513. Into it went a good many disparate, and even contradictory, emotions and desires: resentment about his misfortune, disillusionment with legal and moral ways of doing things if this was where they landed you, desire to understand what had happened and how to avoid its happening again, desire to show off his political perspicacity to the new rulers of Florence in order to get his job back, a hope that out of writing some good would come—to him, to Florence, to Italy, perhaps even to posterity. In every chapter—some more clearly than others—he was trying to do two things at once: to understand and to reform. The two were related in a simple enough way: without understanding there could be no reform. The reason why reform schemes of intellectuals have invariably failed in the past, he is convinced, is that they have not been founded on politics as they actually are. He is acutely aware that he is breaking with tradition, with the “Mirror of Princes” literature which urged princes to act like good men and assumed everything would be all right if they did. “My intention being to write something of use to those who understand, it appears to be more proper to go to the real truth of the matter” than to imaginary states which have never existed, he says. What is done is so far removed from what *ought* to be done that anyone who wants to seize and hold power must “learn how not to be good.” *The Prince* is a sharp but desperate appeal to certain fellow Florentines in high places—desperate because it appeals to men who have forgotten God and who have over-civilized man—to play the beast, in order to gain a certain measure of civic independence and individual dignity. It is all too easy to point out the glaring flaw in the argument. If the goal is really “to found a new realm and

adorn it with good laws, good arms, good friends, and good examples," as chapter 24 seems to suggest—and this is estimating the goal at its best—will this end be achieved by the means suggested or will the means corrupt the end? Does obsession with the power factors involved in any political situation result in a regime adorned with "good laws" and "good examples," or does it result merely in irresponsible despotism and more corruption?

Machiavelli never really faced up to this question, but he was too intelligent to ignore it entirely. Whether by original design or not, *The Prince* became a sort of "Part I" to a larger work in Machiavelli's mind, a book on republics. In 1514, the year after he finished *The Prince*, Machiavelli was again bored. He wrote Vettori he was not reading the ancients or discoursing on the moderns any more because in spite of advancing middle age he had fallen in love again. But the pull of his old interests was stronger even than the delights of Venus. By 1515 he seems to have been visiting the city regularly to discuss the classical historians with congenial friends in the Rucellai gardens, and between 1515 and 1517 *The Discourses on Livy* had taken shape.

Felix Gilbert sees evidence of development from the "realism" and contemporaneity of *The Prince* to the "idealism" and classicism of *The Discourses*.¹³ As Machiavelli got further away from his political career in time, he became more of an intellectual and a scholar. Influenced by his humanist friends, he saw things in larger perspective and began to elaborate his long-term ideal in a lengthy commentary on the classical historian Livy. *The Prince* was for a moment of political corruption and crisis. *The Discourses* were to be for a better time, for all time. The ideal, of course, was the Roman Republic. *The Discourses* were

concerned with the reasons for Rome's greatness and (by implication) the rules for success which apply to any state. Machiavelli, although probably not an atheist, had eliminated God from any effective part in history. He had eliminated eternity and infinity as the criteria by which political success is to be judged, and so was left with duration in time and extension in space. Rome was great because her regime lasted so long and because her rule extended so widely. Careful study of her history would reveal general rules for success which could be compressed into maxims and applied to the contemporary situation, since human nature never changes and history constantly repeats itself. That is, the same human beings will be continually going through the same typical political experiences in the future as in the past—and if you know the rules of the game and the record-book, you will naturally do better than if you don't.

"I have resolved to open *a new route*, which has not yet been followed by anyone," Machiavelli writes at the beginning of *The Discourses*.¹⁴ If the results are effective, he adds, "I shall at least have shown the way to others, who will carry out my views with greater ability, eloquence, and judgment." What is this "new route"? It is the serious study of history with a view to developing a science of politics as a yardstick for social reform. Everyone reads and admires the ancients, he says, but no one *does* anything about his reading. The trouble is that men read history for fun when they ought to read it for profit. Machiavelli hopes that those who read his book will derive "those *advantages* which should be the aim of all study of history." By "advantages" he means both knowledge and inspiration: knowledge of the rules for political success (meaning the power to endure and the power to expand), and inspiration to follow these rules

through the illustrious example of the ancient Romans, both as individuals and as a people. He concludes his preface to the Second Book on a poignantly personal note, the perennial hope of the man of action turned intellectual: "It is the duty of an honest man to teach others that good which the malignity of the times and of fortune has prevented his doing himself; so that among the many capable ones whom he has instructed, some one perhaps, more favored by Heaven, may perform it."¹⁵

The "new route," with all its presuppositions and surprising implications, is all compressed into one arresting paragraph, which merits quoting in full:

Whoever considers the past and present will readily observe that all cities and all peoples are and ever have been animated by the same desires and passions; so that it is *easy*, by diligent study of the past, to foresee what is likely to happen in the future in any republic, and to apply those remedies that were used by the ancients, or, not finding any that were employed by them, to devise new ones from the similarity of events. But as such considerations are neglected or not understood by most of those who read, or, if understood by these, are unknown to those who govern, it follows that the same troubles generally recur in all republics.¹⁶

What Machiavelli seems to say here is that *because* human nature is always the same and *because* history goes round in cycles, knowledge and prediction are possible. But since the endless revolution in cycles seems to depend on men's *ignorance* of the process, knowledge of its rules and "remedies" may somehow break the cyclical process and history may straighten out into progress in a straight line. Whether he meant to say this or not, I am not sure. The important point is that Machiavelli was trying to use the best of the scientist's *and* the humanist's approach to truth, in an age which knew little real differentiation between them. The humanist finds wisdom and insight in tradition, and values

continuity; the scientist finds new truth in careful observation and rational analysis, and values independence from tradition. Machiavelli went back to the ancients as authority, like a good humanist, and found in them the hope of developing a science of political behavior, like a good scientist. He had the humanist's belief in the power of direct inspiration from historical study, and the scientist's belief in the power of detached observation and rational interpretation. He was more of a scientist than any political writer of his day, more of a humanist than most political scientists today.

It is important to note, however, that it is Machiavelli the humanist rather than Machiavelli the scientist who is alive today. The carefully-elaborated structure of political generalizations, theorems, and maxims which he erected with such assurance has crumbled away. It never became the foundation for our modern social sciences, which have found other more carefully-tested supports. It was too early to found an experimentally grounded science of man. But to the practical politician and the statesman, to the self-seeker and the public benefactor alike, Machiavelli the humanist, the political artist, the clear-sighted but hot-blooded interpreter of power politics is still very much alive. Both dictators and democrats read him, scholars and men of affairs pay tribute to him, even theologians now appreciate him. Why? What did he really accomplish that was so important? What were his strengths and limitations as seen from four centuries away?

I suppose the answer is that he really did find a "new route," a new intellectual and moral framework in which to set the confusing political developments of his day—a framework so satisfying to many political thinkers and actors

that it still in use today. This new perspective might be set down somewhat summarily as follows:

The world of men in which we find ourselves is a treacherous, constantly-changing affair. Whether it is ultimately an ordered cosmos we do not know, but it does not look as if it were. Man is alone in this world and on his own. Most men are ignorant, ambitious, ungrateful, and not to be trusted. Among individuals and groups there is a constant struggle for power. Human desires are limitless. When ambition ceases to drive men on, fear takes over and does the job. Democracies and republics are just as insatiable for power under certain circumstances as dictatorships and despotisms. There are no "safe" courses in diplomacy and politics, only choices between evils and dangers. In this world there are a few—only a few—who have intelligence, courage, and public spirit. If these few will only exercise their brains and wills, and not be squeamish about the means they use, perhaps some limited good may be achieved, some stability gained in the midst of flux, some virtue in the midst of corruption. The best we can do is to study the repetitive patterns of our social existence as carefully as we can, decide upon the best courses, choose our ways with intelligence and boldness, and stick by our choices with determination.

Machiavelli saw the essentially demonic nature of power. He saw that power is never tamed by moral precepts and that often the worst anarchy is the result of the best intentions. He never doubted the value of personal morality, as his own career proved, but he came to feel that there is a political morality which has its own autonomy and which must inevitably cancel out personal morality in moments of crisis. He was a ruthless critic of all who dreamed of ends without any concern for whether the means existed to attain

them—and of all who saw how to attain their ends but lacked the courage to act on their insight. “It very seldom happens that a good man is willing to become prince by bad means, though his object be good,” he remarked ruefully. “Men know not how to be gloriously wicked or perfectly good. . . . And when a crime has something of grandeur and nobility in it, they flinch.”¹⁷

This last sentence suggests some of the classic caveats about Machiavelli as political analyst and reformer—because men have been “flinching” from his doctrine ever since they learned of it. The new political morality which he sketched out was purely pragmatic, to be tested not by intentions but by results. There was little if any continuity between this political morality and the traditional personal morality of the classical and Christian traditions. Machiavelli’s state, it has often been remarked, was as isolated, as self-sufficient, as proud and free-standing as a Renaissance statue. He found “a new order” as he hoped, but it had too little continuity, too little organic relationship with the old for healthy, well-balanced growth. He saw two of the dimensions of power, the physical and the intellectual. And perhaps he tended to exaggerate both: not only the power of the pen (exaggeration here is par-for-the-course with intellectuals in general), but also the power of the sword (exaggeration here is what happens when intellectuals lean over backward to prove that they are tough-minded men of affairs: “Scholars and literary men often seem more given to the inverted idealism of *Realpolitik* than working diplomats,” Garrett Mattingly observes¹⁸). But in a sense Machiavelli missed the third dimension of power, the moral dimension. It is possible to argue that Machiavelli, the consummate realist, the resolute facer of thing-as-they-are, had one blind-spot which made

him unable to see the reality of moral and spiritual forces in the lives of men.

This leaves us with a final paradox. The penetration and profundity of Machiavelli's thought is integrally related to his experience as a human being, as is all great thought in the humanities. What a man has learned in the venture of living, as husband, father, and citizen, has a great deal to do with how deeply he can penetrate as philosopher or poet or artist or student of literature, or even as historian and political scientist. Machiavelli's experience as a man and as a bureaucrat, taken together with his dismissal from office, were the origins of his political thought, both in its greatness and in its limitations. Two of his most famous maxims—that it is necessary on occasions for a prince to break his faith, and that deliberate frightfulness is often a good thing—are evidences of a sort of emotional high tension which can be traced to his political disappointment (there is hardly a trace of either of these doctrines in his letters before his dismissal in 1512). So it could be said—with the soundest psychiatric backing, I am sure—that if Machiavelli had only got his job back, or had learned to accept the frustration of his political ambition with more equanimity, we would have had a less cynical, less amoral, and better balanced political doctrine from him. I agree. But the paradox is that in this case he would never have written it down at all.

II. THOMAS MORE

Some five years after Machiavelli's death, a close student of his little book on *The Prince*, Thomas Cromwell, became the chief minister of King Henry VIII of England. His only rival for the King's favor, Thomas More, had resigned as

Lord Chancellor the day after the clergy acknowledged Henry as Supreme Head of the Church of England in place of the Pope (May, 1532). Cromwell brought More a message from the King soon after his resignation, and they had a lengthy talk. At the end, More said: "Master Cromwell, you are now entered into the service of a most noble, wise, and liberal prince; if you will follow my poor advice, you shall, in your counsel-giving unto his Grace, ever tell him what he *ought* to do, but never what he is *able* to do. . . . For if a lion knew his own strength, hard were it for any man to rule him." More's biographer remarks that we can think of this interview "as one where the Utopian faced the Machiavellian, provided we use these words without prejudice. . . . It was not necessarily idealism facing villainy."¹⁹

Whatever it was, the wider issues behind this confrontation—moralism *vs.* realism, what ought to be *vs.* what is—have fascinated students of *Utopia* and *The Prince* all the way from Jean Bodin in the later sixteenth century to Gerhard Ritter in the twentieth. Ritter, a non-Nazi but nationalistic German historian writing just at the opening of the Second World War, used Machiavelli and More as pegs on which to hang reflections on the contrast between continental and English political thinking, between German realism born of continental power politics and English moralism born of insular isolation.²⁰ Bodin, writing four centuries earlier in the midst of a civil war, tried to find his own balance between Machiavelli's disillusionment and More's never-never land. I have found students unfailingly interested and aroused to battle by my asking them to assume that Machiavelli's Prince and More's Utopia actually exist, then to imagine what happens if the Prince lands on Utopia. Will he be helpless, or will he have the place organized in a

few months? So long as men continue to be worried about the relation between might and right, between politics and morality, these two thinkers, who were working away at their rival schemes of reform during the same years about a thousand miles away from each other, will remain alive in the memory of Western society.

The political and intellectual environment in which the young Thomas More grew up was of course different from Machiavelli's Florence. The underlying problems were the same: the decay of medieval institutions, the growth of strong centers of political power, and the spread of capitalistic practices in the economy. But there was more continuity with the immediate past in More's England, and the social tensions resulting from change took different forms. Henry VII, the first Tudor, had pretty well scotched the danger of feudal anarchy by strengthening the monarchy, building up a surplus in the treasury, holding a tight rein on the nobility, and keeping England out of war abroad. His methods were not always scrupulous, but it took hard-headed policies to deal with pretenders to his shaky throne and with overmighty subjects. Since the end result was peace and order and surcease of civil war, Machiavelli would have approved—and so have most modern historians. But a sensitive contemporary might well have been dismayed by Henry's financial exactions, his enforcement of long-forgotten laws to raise money, and his practice of getting a grant from Parliament for a war, then calling off the war and keeping the money. The same sensitive observer might well have been disturbed for different reasons by the adventurous foreign policy of his son, Henry VIII. Within five years of coming to the throne in 1509, Henry VIII had squandered his father's surplus on a futile war with France, the chief

motive of which was to gain glory for the young monarch.

Machiavelli, you will remember, was impressed by two things as he was growing to maturity; the factional fights which tore his native city to pieces, and its weakness with respect to the big powers of the day. More, on the other hand, was a subject of one of the better-run national monarchies of the sixteenth-century. His country had just come through a time of troubles but was now strong, united, and in no danger of invasion or conquest. In fact, if there was any danger, it was that England would let her recovery go to her head and dissipate her new-found strength in continental adventures. There was little danger any more of organized feudal revolt or lawlessness. But there were disturbing signs that the energies of the ruling class, which had once gone into the wars with France and the Wars of the Roses, were now going into economic exploitation of the people and cut-throat competition for favor at the court. More was the son of a London lawyer, and he spent some years in his teens as a page in the household of Cardinal Morton, a churchman of integrity and devotion. It was natural for him to look at the social problems of his day through the eyes of a city-dweller or of a clergyman. The danger, as he would see it, was not so much anarchy as tyranny, not so much urban factions as feudal greed and arrogance, not so much national weakness as national aggressiveness.

The intellectual influence of overwhelming importance on More was Christian humanism.²¹ It is hard today to recapture the enthusiasm of the Christian humanists—Reuchlin, Erasmus, Lefèvre d'Étaples, John Colet, and More himself—because what they believed possible seems utterly unrealistic as we look back on it. They believed they could

save their society by reviving the best in both classical and Christian antiquity, going back to Plato and the Gospels, reconciling the two traditions, and stripping off all medieval accretions and distortions. They were Christian intellectuals with an infectious belief in the power of good scholarship and proper education. They thought that if men only *knew* what Socrates said and what Jesus preached, if men could only be made to see the gulf between apostolic Christianity and sixteenth-century Christianity, reform would inevitably follow. No one could stop it, once men of intelligence and good-will had been exposed to the best that had come down from ancient Greece and Palestine. Erasmus met More on his first trip to England in 1499, and for the next twenty years he and More and John Colet were in close touch with each other, plotting the strategy of a Christian humanism which would overthrow scholasticism, restore knowledge of the best in pagan and Christian antiquity, and ultimately revive a corrupt and war-torn Christendom.

Practically all of these men were pure intellectuals—writers, teachers, scholars, with no professional responsibility for carrying into practice the reforms they advocated. Thomas More was the outstanding exception: a deeply-devoted Christian and a scholar in all his instincts, but one who was called early to a busy and exhausting career as a lawyer and public official. The strong streak of Christian piety in him almost led him to become a Carthusian monk, and he never entirely put aside the possibility, always admired the monastic ideal, and secretly wore a hair-shirt next to his skin all his life. But he remained a layman, married, begot a large family, and followed in his father's footsteps in the law, soon combining his private practice with the office of Under Sheriff of the City of London. The duties of

this office are not clear, but More's chief job seems to have been to represent the interests of the London merchant community in legal relationships with the Crown. Henry VIII and Wolsey came to know the young lawyer and covet his services for the Crown. Just when the King began to press More to enter the royal service we do not know, but we find him a member of an embassy to the Netherlands in the summer of 1515, still merely representing the City's interests on an *ad hoc* mission and not yet a royal official.

The embassy proved to be an important event in More's life. Apparently there were lulls in the negotiations (as there always are) while both sides waited for further instructions from home. More visited an old friend, Peter Giles, in Antwerp, and there was time for talk, for thought, and for writing. Somehow, away from his family, away from his native land, temporarily unoccupied by the press of business, he began to let his imagination take flight. The world was surely in a parlous state, as perhaps it always had been. More had seen its seamy side as a lawyer. He was a good lawyer, but hated most of what he had to do. He was peculiarly sensitive to what happens to the little man in the toils of the law and the clutches of the rich. He knew that the economic revolution which had struck England—the conversion of arable land to pasture because of the profit to be made from sheep-farming—was causing misery and suffering among the poor. Unemployment led to vagabondage, vagabondage to thievery; then the thieves were punished by a savage death penalty—which did not stop the thievery or save the souls of the victims. Meanwhile the rich squandered the profits of their exploitation and monopoly on clothes, servants, and luxuries. Everywhere pride, greed, and idleness—and among princes, nothing but a ceaseless and

senseless struggle for more gold and more territory. Not a pretty picture—and surely an excuse for cynicism.

How would it look, however, to a Christian humanist? There were certain unexploited resources in the classical and Christian traditions which might be utilized to help solve sixteenth-century problems, if only they could be brought vividly before men's imaginations. This matter of 'mine-and-thine,' for instance, which was at the root of all the trouble: Plato knew that if his governors were to develop any true sense of community among themselves, private property must be denied them. The first apostles held all their goods in common, and the first rule of all truly strenuous Christianity communities ever since had been renunciation of property. Granted that man will always remain a sinner. Still, his nature is to a large extent the product of his environment. What if he should take seriously the ideals of Plato's Republic and the medieval monastery? Wasn't it theoretically possible to build a society based on communism of goods in which pride in its way of life and satisfaction with the results would curb the natural tendency to greed of its individual members? Perhaps such a society actually existed, now, somewhere in the vast expanses of the world recently opened up to wondering European eyes since Columbus's momentous voyage twenty-three years before. At any rate, the startling tales of mariners back from the New World and walking the streets of Antwerp suggested that this sort of thing was not beyond believing.

This is a not altogether fanciful account of what went through More's head in the summer of 1515 as he whiled away the time at Peter Giles's in Antwerp. It is based, of course, on what came out of his head at the end of the summer: namely, a manuscript describing the people and

customs of "Utopia," and representing Book II of what we have in print today plus the first five pages of Book I as preface.²² It was a startlingly original combination of daring imagination and hard realism, lightened by turns of sheer wit and horseplay. Almost every feature of Utopian life and thought (except the more obviously humorous bits) was designed as a remedy or palliative to some concrete social evil which More knew at first-hand. His realistic lawyer's grasp of his own society, its economic, social, and political problems, lay behind every flight of the imagination. He drew on his wide knowledge of classical and Christian literature for ideas, but there was no literal copying of tradition anywhere. For instance, communism in Utopia is the way of life of the whole nation, not of a few governors (as in Plato) or of an isolated group (as in the monastery); yet there is still much of Plato's and St. Benedict's spirit in it.

Not only in detail, but also in the architecture of the whole, the second book of *Utopia* is a Christian humanist's carefully-developed remedy for the three key sins of English society—sloth, greed, and especially pride—as the brilliant little study of J. H. Hexter shows so convincingly.²³ Everyone is compelled to work in Utopia so that idleness may never become a badge of social privilege. Greed is nipped in the bud by providing everyone with economic security. And pride is given nothing to feed upon, at least in the individual's life. With true Christian insight, More rates pride as a deadlier sin than greed—"the princess and mother of all mischief," in fact. Without pride, without the limitless desire to outshine other persons, to show off, to out-spend and out-consume all social rivals, to play God on earth, greed would be comparatively easy to handle, More seems to suggest. At any rate, the strict and dreary egalitarianism

of Utopia is designed just as clearly to exterminate pride as it is to curb avarice.

We need not enter into the tangle of later arguments about the meaning of Utopia—whether it is more “humanistic” or more “Christian,” whether it looks back to the Middle Ages or forward to Karl Marx, for instance. The question whether More was fundamentally serious or just writing for fun, however, is relevant. There seems to be little doubt, since the fine biography of R. W. Chambers some twenty years ago, that More’s intent was serious: to show how an ideal society based on reason alone without the benefit of revelation, might still put to shame a Christian society which did not live up to the truth revealed to it. The literalist can of course walk heavy-footed through *Utopia* and show you that More didn’t mean this or that seriously, and the pedant can prove that it’s all a story told by an old traveler and that *More* never said *he* believed it. But there is too much in both the design and detail of *Utopia* that has the ring of passionate sincerity about it for any thoughtful reader to doubt that the writer was trying to get something across. If we can still argue about what Erasmus was trying to do in his *Praise of Folly* and Machiavelli in *The Prince*, it is natural to wonder about what More meant to accomplish by picturing an imaginary island, remarkably like England in geography and remarkably unlike England in social customs, supposedly in actual existence here and now, removed from Europe not in time but simply by space—which was quite different from either Plato’s Republic or Augustine’s City of God, incidentally. I think he was trying to say: stretch your imaginations, exercise your fancy, get out of the mental ruts men have been in for centuries, stop reconciling yourselves to social evil as inevitable, and keep

steadily before you the picture of *what might be* as the measure of what is. You may not, and probably will not, set up communism of goods overnight, he seems to say, but if you have seriously considered the advantages of a communist society, at least you will never again look on private property as an absolute, an untouchable right to be defended against all attempts to limit it.

One of the effects, if not one of the purposes, of *Utopia* was to answer a man whom More had never read, namely Machiavelli. Parts of *Utopia*, it has been remarked before this, read like a comment on *The Prince*. In judging crimes, the Utopians look not to the overt results but "count the intent and pretended purpose as evil as the act or deed itself."²⁴ Agreements between princes are kept of course in Europe, says the narrator Raphael with obvious irony, but in the new world where *Utopia* is situated, princes find loop-holes in treaties by crafty dodges which they would loudly condemn if used in private dealings. So out there it looks as if there are two kinds of justice:

. . . the one meet for the inferior sort of people, going afoot and creeping low by the ground, and bound down on every side with many bands so that it shall not run at rovers. The other a princely virtue, which like as it is of higher majestie than the other poor justice, so also it is of much more liberty, as to the which nothing is unlawful that it lusteth after.²⁵

The result is that the Utopians make no formal alliances whatever in the belief that "men be better and more surely knit together by love and benevolence than by covenants of leagues."²⁶ Only two years before, Machiavelli had remarked, "The experience of our times shows those princes to have done great things who have had little regard for good faith . . . and who have ultimately overcome those who have made loyalty their foundation"; therefore, "a pru-

ent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it could be against his interest." "Everybody sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are," Machiavelli concluded; "the end justifies the means"; therefore let a prince aim at "conquering and maintaining the state, and the means will always be judged honorable and praised by every one, for the vulgar is always taken by appearances and the issue of the event—and the world consists only of the vulgar. . . ." ²⁷ The issue between personal morality and "princely virtue" has never been stated better.

The chief difference between Machiavelli's thought-world and that of More, however, cannot be illustrated by direct quotation. It has to do with time and change. Utopia is a completely static society. Since its foundation by King Utopus there has been no significant change, no development, no "history" in fact, and presumably there will be no change in the future. The assumptions underlying Utopia are: first, that evil is essentially social as well as individual, and so any effective attack on it must be through the creation of a new social structure, a new environment; second, this environment, once it is created, will curb and control individual tendencies to evil, even if it will not entirely root out human sin; and third, there are timeless rules of reason which may be discovered and used in designing this new social structure. With much of this Machiavelli, especially in *the Discourses*, would agree. But Machiavelli could never escape from the time dimension as the Utopians succeed in doing. His test of a prince was ability to change with "times and circumstances," his test of a republic was ability to endure in time and expand in space. Nothing is at rest in *the Prince* and *The Discourses*; everything is at rest in *Utopia*. To Machiavelli the real world is a continuous strug-

gle for power between competing vitalities; to More, in *Utopia*, it is a world in which power can be controlled and disciplined, nay even rendered harmless. Machiavelli is consciously an intellectual revolutionary, always striving for a "new order," a "new route." More is a conservative who pictures a society, built on reason, devoting an enormous part of its energy simply to preserving the status quo.

More's picture is worth examining more closely. *Utopia* is an artificial island—it was King Utopus who dug the fifteen-mile channel that separates it from the continent. Geographical isolation both makes possible and intensifies the Utopians' psychological isolation from their neighbors. What holds the rather loose federation of Utopian cities together is national sentiment, as we would call it—pride in the Utopian way of life, which the inhabitants know is quite different from that of others and which must thus be jealously protected and preserved.²⁸ There are all kinds of ingenious devices to preserve the status quo, to keep the number in each family constant, to keep the population at a constant level, to balance trade, and to maintain international peace so that the Utopian welfare state may not be disturbed in its enjoyment of the good life. The Utopians are far more wealthy and powerful than any of their neighbors, and so they go to war only in "just" causes. The list of "just" causes is rather long, it must be confessed and includes resistance to Utopian colonization of backward areas and injuries done to merchants of allied powers. The Utopians use their overwhelming power only to execute right and justice—and in Raphael's account of it, their neighbors seem to grant the Utopians' moral and cultural superiority as good grounds for their policy. In fact, there is a strong streak of moral righteousness in all that they do

They are harder on their own condemned criminals than on their foreign slaves "because they being so godly brought up to virtue in so excellent a commonwealth" still went wrong.²⁹ Their principal objective in going to war is "to obtain that thing, which if they had before obtained, they would not have moved battle"—an excellent principle too seldom followed by belligerents. But, the account continues, "if that be not possible, they take so cruel vengeance of them which be in the fault, that ever after they be afeared to do the like."³⁰ Because Utopian manhood is so precious, they prefer to fight by the crafty use of money and propaganda, and by tricks which would delight a Machiavellian. They use their friends' and allies' troops before their own. But if they are finally forced to fight, they fight hard, knowing they are in the right, and they impose stiff indemnities on their defeated victims.

It took German historians like Ritter to point out that this insular self-righteousness, which is such an amusing characteristic of Utopian policy, is not unlike some later aspects of British foreign policy.³¹ With no land frontier to defend, it was hard for Englishmen to understand the Machiavellism of continental powers which were caught in the continuous struggle for power, and easy for them to read the moral law to their obstreperous neighbors. The unconscious assumption of English statesmen often was that a free people's acts could not be anything but moral, whereas the acts of continental despotisms would *ipso facto* be immoral. Further, it was natural for the British to equate morality with preserving the status quo and immorality with upsetting it. It is certainly not fair to burden More with any responsibility for *forming* later British policy. But it is sound to point out, as Ritter does, that More was thoroughly medieval

in his belief in timeless standards of right and justice, that he thought the use of power justified only as a means of enforcing right or justice, and that war made sense to him only as an instrument of justice meting out punishment—not as a more or less natural result of competing wills-to-live, as it looked to Machiavelli. More believed that power could be harnessed and tamed by righteousness. But his later German critics are justified in asking the embarrassing question: how would those neighboring backward peoples really feel about the high-and-mighty Utopians, with their goods which they never enjoy, their “dumping” policy in foreign trade, their big citizen army, and their high moral principles? Is the struggle for power abolished by imagining it out of existence? Or does it slip in by the back door after the moralist has bolted and barred the front? More’s *Utopia* is the work of a conscientious Christian humanist, humane and civilized in spirit. But there is a streak of moralism and self-righteousness in it that is related to the later More who conscientiously supported the burning of heretics.

Now let us return to the author of this lively description of an imaginary island, back from the embassy to the Netherlands at the end of 1515, and leading his friend Peter Gilles to believe that the manuscript would very soon appear in print. It did not appear for over a year, and when it did it was expanded to include a marvelous dialogue between the narrator, Raphael Hythlodæ, Peter Gilles, and Thomas More himself. This was sandwiched in between the final five pages of the original version and the actual description of Utopia. Why was this dialogue added, and what does it mean in the light of all we know about More himself?

The first to answer these questions convincingly, it seems to me, has been Professor Hexter in the study I have already

mentioned.³² In brief, there is strong indirect evidence that More was wrestling hard in the summer of 1516 with the most important problem a Christian intellectual can face: to what extent must he be responsible for carrying out his ideas *himself* if the opportunity is offered? Erasmus was with him in the summer of 1516, and the presumption is that there were long talks between them about Henry VIII's pressure on More to become a privy councilor. No one knows how Erasmus argued, but the way he lived out the answer himself is well known. The calling of a Christian scholar is a high one, he might have maintained. It takes all of a man's time and energy. Furthermore, it requires absolute independence and integrity. You cannot be committed to spending a certain number of hours a day at court and still study and write. More important, you cannot be the servant of a King and still think you are free to speak and write as your mind and conscience dictate. Either you commit yourself to the truly important task, the re-education of Christendom through restoration of the best in classical and Christian antiquity, or you become so entangled in worldly affairs that your tongue and pen lose their cutting edge, and you no longer are an intellectual and a reformer worthy of the name. I repeat: Erasmus may or may not have spoken thus to More, but this was really what he had bet his own life on—and More himself had strong sympathies with this point of view. Could he not argue that to have written the description of *Utopia* was enough? Let others read it and work out the applications. The important thing was the intellectual's task of seeing things clearly and presenting the truth persuasively.

There was another side to More, however—the lawyer, the man of affairs, the realist. In *Utopia* he remembers that his

old mentor, Cardinal Morton, had served Henry VII well. "The King put much trust in his counsel, the weal public also in a manner leaned unto him," he says.³³ In sixteenth-century Europe, kings had the power, and to counsel kings successfully was to put new ideas into effect and to bring about the public good. How could a Christian humanist, who honestly believed in the ideals embodied in *Utopia*, refuse the opportunity to implement them by counseling a king if offered the chance?

All this is argued out in the dialogue between Raphael Hythlodaye and More in the First Book of *Utopia*.³⁴ With his vast experience of other societies, Raphael should offer his services to a king, says More. Never, says Raphael. Imagine me in the French King's Council. The question for discussion is how the king can hold onto Milan, recover Naples, conquer Venice, gobble up the Netherlands, and still avoid a stab in the back by England. If I stand up and say: Turn over a new leaf, gentlemen; learn a new lesson; my advice is to stay out of Italy and Flanders entirely; there is enough to do in providing good government for a large country like France without wasting the nation's blood in foreign conquest—who would listen to me in such a hard-headed group? In such a situation, who listens to a man who brings up something he knows was done in times past or has seen done in some other place?

Well, says More, I did not mean that you should make yourself ridiculous by always proposing impossibly idealistic policies. This "school philosophy" naturally has no place in royal councils. But there is a more tactful and diplomatic way, a "philosophy more civil." This is to "handle the matter wittily," and to see that what you can't turn to good still does not come out too badly. "You must not leave and forsake

the commonwealth; you must not forsake the ship in a tempest [simply] because you cannot rule and keep down the winds," he says to Raphael.³⁵

Raphael is unconvinced. Either he must speak the truth or remain silent, he says. He is afraid that More's "crafty and subtle" approach really amounts to compromising with the truth. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to conceal your real opinions in a royal council. Unless you go along with wicked and foolish decisions of the majority, you will quickly be accounted a spy or even a traitor. And if you do go along with the decisions, the wickedness and folly will of course be attributed to you by the outside world. This is the last word, and Raphael, representing More's "pure intellectual" side, speaks it. But the dialogue is obviously the work of a man deeply divided in mind and heart.

This was where the argument was left when *Utopia* went to the printer in Louvain under Erasmus' supervision in December, 1516. For two more years More held out. Then what the English weathercasters call a "bright spell" seemed to pass over the political landscape. Wolsey began to defend the poor against enclosures, the King became strongly peace-minded, and the future looked bright.³⁶ More entered the royal service and soon he was privy councilor, Speaker of the House of Commons, and finally Lord Chancellor. His career as an independent Christian humanist, as a reforming intellectual, ceased (as he had seen it would) and his preparation for martyrdom began (as he had dimly sensed it would). Raphael's predictions came true, one by one. More made it clear to the king that he disagreed with the divorce proceedings, but that he would remain silent in public. Thomas Cromwell, however, with his clear Machiavellian vision, saw that it was More's refusal to say what he could

not believe that was "making others so stiff as they be." And so, because he stood in the way of a revolution, More was condemned for treason on perjured testimony and sent to the block—twenty years after *Utopia* was conceived and three years after the appearance in print of Machiavelli's *Prince* and *The Discourses*. In a sense he had deliberately ended his career as a Christian humanist and reformer when he entered the royal service, in order to attest his belief that an intellectual must be ultimately willing to put his ideas to the test of practice, and that a Christian, like his Master, must be ready to be crucified for his beliefs.

III. CONTEMPORARY ECHOES

I have tried to sketch the contrasting development of the two great political analysts of the early sixteenth century. Each in his own way tried to probe to the roots of the bewildering social evils of his day. Each tried like a good intellectual to see things whole, to explore every relevant resource in tradition, to use every important piece of evidence from history and contemporary experience. In trying to see things whole, they got the desire to set things straight. Or perhaps it is just as correct to say that their desire to set things straight drove them to the mental effort of seeing things whole.

They did not reach the same conclusions, of course. They differed—profoundly and fundamentally—in spite of much in common. And this points up the truth—or is it a truism?—that humanistic knowledge is not like scientific knowledge. It does not accumulate, like the sedimentary layers which eventually form a single, solid rock. Rather it grows like a group of organisms which are like each other and yet each one unique, intimately dependent on their surrounding environment of light, air, and nourishment, always subject to

the possibility of annihilation. Where insight and evaluation are involved, the humanist turns to the best he knows of ancient wisdom on a subject and uses this wisdom as an essential intellectual resource in a fresh and realistic analysis of his own particular historical situation. Times change, but are never altogether different. The world of Plato, the world of Thomas More, and the world of today are very different, but they are not so different that Plato and More are irrelevant to us. A modern physicist need not know much about Aristotle or how he arrived at his ideas of motion. To be sure, he builds on Newton's laws, but he cares little about how Newton came to formulate them. The historical and biographical detail which has formed the substance of these lectures, however, is important to the humanist because the way intellectuals become social reformers, the way their human experience contributes to their social insight, is still relevant to us. And their conclusions are still alive in a way those of the medieval astrologer are not alive for the modern scientist. The antinomy of realism and moralism in the analysis of politics, for instance, must be argued through for each generation, in the light of its particular historical circumstances and needs. In their day Machiavelli and More seemed utterly irreconcilable. To Machiavelli the ceaseless struggle for power must be accepted as one of the brute facts of life. You can learn how to use it, he might say; and in certain ideal circumstances you can balance power against power and so attain a certain stability and order; but you can never tame power, never outlaw it or ignore it. To Thomas More in *Utopia*, on the other hand, the struggle for power may be so curbed and contained by the proper structure of law and right that for all practical purposes its capacity for evil can be forgotten. The causes of ambition and sedition have been so skillfully "plucked up by the roots" in Utopia that the

society will "endure for ever" and no foreign prince will be able to shake it, Raphael says.³⁷ And so the Machiavellian and the Utopian come down to us from the sixteenth century as symbols of an eternal contradiction. The Machiavellian sees nothing but material power and is blind to moral and spiritual forces; the Utopian overestimates moral forces and thinks he can exorcise the demon of power in the end.

From this distance, however, it looks as if we are dealing not with contradiction or paradox in the case of Machiavelli *versus* More, but with what our scientist friends would call complementarity. Obviously no government that ignores the pure power factors in its position will survive long—nor will one that fails to convert naked power into some structure of right. Pascal summed it up a century later in that bitter, penetrating way he had of stabbing to the heart of the matter: "Justice without might is helpless; might without justice is tyrannical. . . . We must therefore combine justice and might, and for this end make what is just strong, or what is strong just. . . . Being unable to cause might to obey justice, men have made it just to obey might. Unable to strengthen justice, they have justified might."³⁸ Pascal's irony is Machiavelli's, but his underlying faith is More's.

And so the dialectic continues from generation to generation. To know the history of the argument, to know its greatest protagonists, is to add perspective and depth to our own self-understanding. Where and by whom is the dialectic being carried forward today? One would naturally look for it in the United States, the power of long isolationist tradition and strong moral beliefs, much like the Utopians in some ways, but recently shocked out of its complacency by being thrust into a deadly competition for existence with a ruthless power of equal strength. And I think you may find a hint of it at least in the writings of two distinguished statesmen who

have also qualified at different times as intellectuals and reformers: George Kennan and John Foster Dulles. You notice I say their "writings." It is too early to judge the active careers of either, but each wrote books and articles around mid-century which were written rapidly and urgently for the general reader, to inform and to reform, much as Machiavelli's *Prince* and More's *Utopia* were written.³⁹

In fact, there are amusing parallels here between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. Mr. Kennan, a distinguished career diplomat, organizer of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, ambassador to the Kremlin and outstanding expert on Russia, was allowed to "retire" from the foreign service in April, 1953, at the age of forty-nine, because the new administration had campaigned against the "containment" policy which he had fathered and so found no use for him. He has since turned to history, like Machiavelli in his retirement, and is engaged in a full-dress study of America and the Russian Revolution, the first volume of which has won wide acclaim. Mr. Dulles, it is said, had been preparing himself for the Secretaryship of State since childhood—with somewhat more zest than Thomas More prepared himself for the royal service. As part of this preparation he wrote extensively on the general subject of foreign policy before he attained his lifelong ambition in January of 1953. And so, like Machiavelli, Mr. Kennan may be considered a statesman more or less involuntarily turned intellectual. Like More, Mr. Dulles was a lawyer and intellectual who ultimately became an active statesman. As in the case of Machiavelli and More, there is much in common between them, and much in sharp dispute.

Mr. Kennan urges us to see the world as it is, not as it might be if all peoples were like the American. Power is the central fact in the world of diplomacy, and it is better

in the long run to devise means of balancing power by old-fashioned diplomacy, he thinks, than to ignore the power factor (which is dangerous), or to rely on legalistic restraints (which is futile). "This is a hard and cruel world we live in," he writes. Other nations don't exactly see us as we see ourselves—peace-loving, law-abiding, willing to live and let live. The rest of the world is not ready to federate in a nice reasonable way as our original thirteen states did; in fact it is not even willing to preserve the status quo which is so favorable to us. The most serious fault in twentieth-century American foreign policy is what Kennan calls "the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems": our faith in arbitration treaties, pacts solemnly outlawing war, schemes for international organization which we expect too much of and so become disillusioned with.⁴⁰ Our legalism easily becomes moral superiority; our wars too readily become wars for righteousness, which means that they are total wars and can only end in total defeats—and this will spell disaster for both sides in an atomic world. We tend to apply our individual moral standards too naïvely to international affairs. "We cannot, when it comes to dealings between governments, assign to moral values the same significance we give them in personal life." We can—and Mr. Kennan fervently hopes we will—follow moral *methods* in our diplomacy. But personal morality can never be a valid test of the *purposes* of a state, nor "a criterion for measuring and comparing the behavior of different states."⁴¹ We would do better, he thinks, if as a people we were less eager to appear morally superior, and more willing to accept the fact that we are a great power which has to do some of the things great powers have always had to do to survive—and not be ashamed about it. Lest you think from this that Mr. Kennan is Machiavelli reincarnated, I hasten to add that he is a

incere Presbyterian layman and writes, "I do not wish to see the conduct of *this* nation in its foreign relations animated by anything else than decency, generosity, moderation, and consideration for others."⁴² But the affinity to the best in Machiavelli's realism is evident enough, this time rooted in a kind of Christian pessimism.

Mr. Dulles is another Presbyterian layman of a somewhat more familiar Calvinist stamp. There is much in his book *War or Peace?* (1950) with which Mr. Kennan would agree, but the whole tone and temper is different. He believes that "in the pattern of our own national life we can find the pattern for world peace."⁴³ Peace can be "patterned," then, and the pattern can be found in the federation of the thirteen colonies and the drafting of the Constitution. The United States became great because of its people's moral beliefs and spiritual convictions, now unfortunately submerged by materialism. Only by recovering her faith in her spiritual destiny can America combat Communism. Where Kennan tends to emphasize the danger from Russia, the world power, Dulles tends to emphasize the threat of Communist ideology. "Power is the key of success in dealing with the Soviet leadership," he writes. But he continues: "Power, of course, includes not merely military power, but economic power and the intangibles, such as moral judgement and world opinion, which determine what men do and the intensity with which they do it."⁴⁴ As one reads on, one realizes that we are in a battle of creeds far more than a conflict of world powers. Mr. Dulles would have us fight like the Utopians, first by propaganda before we draw the sword. He has great faith in legal structures, moral arguments, and non-material forces. Like the Utopians, he has no doubt about who is right and who is wrong (he has often been ready to treat both friend and foe to little lectures on the subject as he steps aboard

planes). But at his best he has the same rugged sense of right combined with realistic grasp of politics that characterized Thomas More's thinking—albeit in Presbyterian rather than papal garb.

And so there is nothing really new in the world of political thought after all. But the corollary is that the big issues are never old and stale either. I had thought that I was more or less "original" in my feeling that George Kennan represents the realistic pole of contemporary American thinking about international affairs and John Foster Dulles the moralistic, until I picked up a little book by a French-Swiss writer, M. Louis Brandt-Peltier, called *Conceptions américaines de politique étrangère: Kennan, Dulles* (Paris, 1953). The author draws the polar contrast between the two even more sharply than I have. America did not become great merely through her moral and spiritual convictions, he points out slyly in reply to Dulles: geographical isolation and the protection of the British navy had something to do with it. Europe prefers a "materialistic" to a moralistic America, he hints. Europeans can accept American economic superiority, he says, but Lord help them if the United States undergoes a religious reform and becomes possessed of some new sense of "Manifest Destiny" to reform the world! He concludes dryly: "What America needs most is to be *enlightened*, not *reformed*."⁴⁵

It may be that enlightenment and reform are more closely related than M. Brandt-Peltier thinks they are. At least Machiavelli and Thomas More thought so. To each in different ways the impulse to reform was integrally related to the impulse to understand. The intellectual as social reformer has his faults, as is perfectly evident in our two subjects themselves. He is apt to see the social landscape in too sharp relief of black and white, and he is prone to exaggerate the

rationality of men. But if we are going to have reformers—and we are, of course—there is a good deal to be said for the proposition that it is better to have men whose itch to change society has grown out of the scholar's desire to grasp the complexities of the social structure than to suffer under the ignorant fanatics and "dim-witted saints" (the phrase is William James's) who clutter the pages of history.

But it is time for me to leave you to think over for yourselves whether you would vote for realism or moralism the next time you have the chance. The argument is still unsettled. Your vote can still affect the results. And if you have got anything at all out of these talks, you may be conscious of Machiavelli and Thomas More peering over your shoulder as you debate the issue within yourself.

E. HARRIS HARBISON

NOTES

1. *The Prince* (Everyman trans.), chap. xxvi.
2. Machiavelli to Ricciardo Bechi, 9 March 1497, in *The Living Thoughts of Machiavelli*, ed. Carlo Sforza (London, 1942), pp. 79-82.
3. See *The Discourses of Niccolò Machiavelli*, ed. Leslie J. Walker (New Haven, 1950), I, 16-20 ff.
4. Machiavelli to Francesco Vettori, 10 December 1513, in *The Living Thoughts*, pp. 101-104.
5. To Vettori, 9 April 1513, *ibid.*, p. 88.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 84-87.
7. 25 April 1513, *ibid.*, pp. 89-96.
8. 26 August 1513, *ibid.*, pp. 96-100.
9. See note 4.
10. See J. H. Whitfield, *Machiavelli* (Oxford, 1947), p. 61.
1. See, e.g., Whitfield, chaps. i, iv; Allan H. Gilbert, *Machiavelli's Prince and its Forerunners* (Durham, 1938); Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), pp. 165-166; Felix Gilbert, "The Humanist Concept of the Prince and the Prince of Machiavelli," *Journal of Modern History*, XI (December, 1939), 449-483.
2. See particularly Felix Gilbert, "The Composition and Structure of Machiavelli's *Discorsi*," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XIV (January, 1953), 136-156; and J. H. Hexter, "Seyssel, Machia-

- velli, and Polybius VI: the Mystery of the Missing Translation," *Studies in the Renaissance*, III (1956), 75-96.
13. In *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XIV (January, 1953), 156.
 14. *The Prince and the Discourses*, ed. Max Lerner (Modern Library ed., New York, 1940), p. 103. Trans. of *Discourses* by C. E. Detmold.
 15. *Ibid.*, pp. 103-105.
 16. Book I, chap. xxix, *ibid.*, p. 216.
 17. *Discourses*, Book I, chaps. xxvii, xxx.
 18. *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 40.
 19. R. W. Chambers, *Thomas More* (New York, 1935), p. 291.
 20. *Machtstaat und Utopie* (1940), trans. as *The Corrupting Influence of Power* (Hadleigh, Essex, 1952).
 21. See J. H. Hexter, *More's Utopia: the Biography of an Idea* (Princeton, 1952), pp. 52 ff.; and E. Harris Harbison, *The Christian Scholar in the Age of the Reformation* (New York, 1956), chap. iii.
 22. Hexter, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-29, and *passim*.
 23. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-81.
 24. *Utopia* (Everyman ed., London, 1910), p. 87.
 25. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
 26. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
 27. *The Prince*, chap. xviii.
 28. *Utopia*, p. 97.
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
 31. *The Corrupting Influence of Power*, pp. 74-89.
 32. *Op. cit.*, pp. 95, 102, 110. What follows is essentially Hexter's account.
 33. *Utopia*, p. 20.
 34. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-20, 34-43.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
 36. Hexter, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-155.
 37. *Utopia*, p. 114.
 38. *Pensées* (Everyman ed., London, 1931), nos. 298, 300.
 39. George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950* (Chicago 1951) and *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton 1954); John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace?* (New York, 1950).
 40. *American Diplomacy*, pp. 95 ff.
 41. *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, pp. 47-50.
 42. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
 43. *War or Peace?*, p. 19.
 44. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
 45. Pp. 179-182.

A TELESCOPIC VIEW OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES*

A FEW years ago when Harry Truman and Tom Dewey were trying to convince sixty million American voters of the vast difference between Republican and Democrat, Wilfred Funk published a book entitled *Word Origins and Their Romantic Stories*.¹ As for the words "democrat" and "republican," Funk observed, "in their present usage they are completely devoid of any realistic meaning; they have become useless as verbal tokens to any rational and intelligent conversation."

Today it occurs to me that the same thing might be said of the words "communist," or "fascist," or "capitalist" or "socialist," even though the terms are bandied about freely by everyone. If the man on the street is asked to define each of these words, he usually is hard put to meet the test. This is so for a variety of reasons.

First, politics is an inexact science, inexact because it deals with man and his behavior, which is unpredictable and changing. The natural sciences have an advantage in being able to label a frog or a chemical element without backtalk—but not so if we ascribe a political philosophy to a man. Moreover, political science not only deals with man, complex as he is, but it deals with the interrelations of millions of men, which further complicates the problem.

Next, political labels actually describe or should describe an entire political philosophy which has many facets and concepts; yet frequently we jump to a conclusion based upon one or two characteristics alone. This may be illustrated by such common examples as saying that a man is a communist or socialist just because he believes in government ownership

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of some means of production. After all, the City of Houston owns the waterworks and the United States government operates the post office in competition with American Telephone and Telegraph and Western Union.

Again, political philosophies are never clear-cut and distinct, and frequently overlap at the edges or even halfway down the center. Many political ideologies have no clear-cut pattern of emergence and disappearance. Like the tides that ebb and flow, they rise and subside, but in the process there are an infinite number of cross-currents and swirls, and only by slow degree can we perceive a change in the shore-line. No sooner can we isolate and define a pure political philosophy than its supporters or critics give it new and different meaning.

And last, we lack a control. We cannot agree upon and isolate a "pure" political philosophy and keep it in a bottle. Without a standard or control, which remains constant to be used for comparison, the natural scientist knows he may fall into error. I have heard, for example, that some native tribes have been convinced for years that they have driven off eclipses of the sun by beating tomtoms, and in proof cite the many they have driven away. But once a political philosophy has had a characteristic changed, whether by a Supreme Court decision on "liberty" or by legislation on "social security," it is humanly impossible to know the exact consequences had an alternative route been followed.

So much for the apology and the difficulties of political definition. Notwithstanding these handicaps we still propose to examine the leading modern political philosophies: totalitarian communism and fascism, and democratic capitalism and socialism. All these political forms have arisen in the setting of the modern state which emerged around the six-

teenth century. It was only with the breakdown of the small self-sufficient units of feudalism, and the opening up of the economic horizons of Europe at the close of the Middle Ages, that conditions favorable to the rapid development of capitalism appeared. Then somewhat after the development of capitalism came that modern industrialization which is a part of the strength of nationalism and an ingredient in each of the "isms" as we know them today.

To include all the possible political ideologies or to deal with the splinter "isms" would require that we deal with far more than the four we have selected (totalitarian communism and fascism, democratic capitalism and socialism). For example, Louis Wasserman in his book *Modern Political Philosophies and What they Mean*,² isolates eighteen. However, all except the four I have named can categorically be disposed of by saying that they are either (a) purely theoretical—such as utopianism or anarchism; or (b) they represent "twilight areas" of the major isms—such as state capitalism, guild socialism, Christian socialism, and the like.

1. MARXISM AND COMMUNISM

In dealing with these vastly different ideologies, I would observe with the late Justice Jackson that the best lecturer on effective fly casting would be the trout. But since we have no communists and fascists among us here tonight, I will try to be as objective as possible.

Turning first to totalitarian communism, we find some characteristics of this ideology in antiquity, especially in ancient Egypt and Sparta. But ancient cultures all condoned slavery, dealt with relatively small populations, and did not function in an industrial society and within an institutional state such as we know today. Thus it is hard to trace modern

communism back to the institutions of the ancient world. Rather, the groundwork of modern communism was laid by Karl Marx.

In the United States, Karl Marx is usually condemned without being read. Yet he is one of the most influential figures of history and has inspired one of the greatest mass movements of all time. His followers would say that just as the Bible made Judaism and Christianity great forces in history, so Marx's expressed ideas (though nowhere collected in a systematic exposition) have maintained Marxism as a great force.³

Marx's personal life left much to be desired. Born in the German Rhineland in 1818, the son of a Jewish father who had deserted the Hebrew faith, Marx was neither Hebrew nor Christian and belonged to no class. He was expelled from the University of Bonn for "nocturnal riots and drunkenness" and at thirty-two left his native Germany, gave up his citizenship, and remained for the rest of his life a man without a country. With remarkable singlemindedness, he toiled unceasingly on his master work, *Das Kapital*. When he died in 1883 he had written only the first volume, but the faithful Engels finished the other two volumes from Marx's notes. Four of Marx's seven children died in infancy and two of the three daughters who survived to maturity committed suicide. A romantic writer⁴ has said of his life that he had one great love, one great friend, and one great master. His one great love was his boyhood sweetheart, Jennie von Westphalen, daughter of a liberal baron, who endured forty years of poverty and squalor without defecting. She would have had ample justification for remarking (as the humorist would have us believe) that "Karl is always talking about *Das Kapital*, but he never brings home any."

The great friend was Frederic Engels, whom Marx met in

Paris in 1844, and who seems to have been as mannerly and gregarious as Marx was misanthropic. Engels had the good fortune, moreover, to be the beneficiary of the capitalist system which he attacked, and as the son of a wealthy businessman he was able to fix an income on Marx. This, supplemented with some income Marx received as foreign correspondent for the New York *Tribune*, and from other writings, enabled him to carry out his dedicated work.⁵

During the thirty-three years in London where Marx wrote *Das Kapital*, factories were expanding rapidly and Marx saw capitalism in all its ugliness. The government was dominated by businessmen and imposed practically no restrictions or regulations upon industry. The great majority of Englishmen were working for the upper classes at the lowest wage which the law of supply and demand would permit, and the labor force was growing. Parents, unable to support their families, put their children to work for seventy-two hours a week in poorly ventilated and highly dangerous factories. The sturdy country folk who were lured into town by this industrial giant were inevitably degenerating. Indeed, the condition of the working class in England as described by Engels in 1844 had sunk to a new low. He describes the feeling (or insensibility) of the worker this way:

How much human feeling, what abilities can a man retain in his thirtieth year who has made needlepoints or filed toothed wheels twelve hours every day from his early childhood, living all the while under the conditions forced upon the proletarian? It is still the same thing since the introduction of steam. The workers' activities are made easy, but the work itself becomes unmeaning and monotonous to the last degree. It offers no field of mental activity but claims just enough of his attention to keep him from thinking of anything else. And a sentence to such work, leaving him scarcely enough time to eat and sleep, none for physical exercise in the open air or the enjoyment of nature, much less for mental activity . . . [cannot help] degrading a human being to the level of a brute. . . .⁶

Marx was disturbed by what he saw, or thought he foresaw, as the conclusion of the problem. Perhaps no one sitting here will ever read the three volumes of *Das Kapital* in their entirety, but the essence of Marx and his methods can probably be outlined by discussing several main ideas, namely: (1) the Hegelian dialectic; (2) the theory of surplus value; (3) the economic or materialist concept of history; (4) the theory of falling profit; and (5) the theory of class struggle and revolution.

Hegelian Dialectic.—If Marx had a great master, it was the philosopher Hegel. Hegel's peculiar dialectic was applied to a world constantly changing. Every accumulated set of forces (called the thesis) is opposed by another set (the antithesis) and from the clash emerges a new combination (synthesis) which contains the best elements of both. Perhaps one today might roughly illustrate by the example of the clash between the Union and the South in the American Civil War and the synthesis that replaced both. Again, we might cite feudalism as the thesis, the middle-class businessman as the antithesis, and today's capitalism and capitalists as the synthesis. Marx's investigations led him to the conclusion that human society would progress in this manner and he set out to prove that capitalism and the proletariat would inevitably clash and this clash would result in the synthesis of socialism.

The economic or materialist concept of history.—Man today is acutely aware of his dependence on his fellow man, and almost everyone living in an urban community is sensitive to the material necessities required to keep body and soul together. When one dwells on this and minimizes all else, he is a pure materialist. But by and large, western man is a moral being who feels that he does not live on bread alone. Marx, however, was a materialist not influenced by any reli-

gious convictions. To him the "mode of economic production"—or the way men make their living—was the total basis on which all society has risen. Concepts of God, religion, love, compassion, ethics, justice, law, and the like, were minimized by the dialectic materialist who saw that man then, and throughout history, has plotted his course by economic incentive alone and that such concepts as morals, politics, religion, and law rest and are dependent upon an economic foundation. This superstructure had been raised by the ruling classes to make tighter their grasp of power and the only way the superstructure could be changed was by a political shakeup of the state in order to change its economic foundation.

Surplus value.—In all his writings, Marx continually harps upon what he calls the "surplus value"—the profits of the capitalist. If a laborer takes a free good worth \$5 (for example, crude metal) and fashions it into a plow selling for \$25, the laborer *should* get the \$20 difference, according to Marx, but instead he usually gets much less, for the bourgeois capitalist takes a share for overhead and then a share for himself. It was unnatural, Marx thought, for any individual to hire another to work for him twelve hours a day and to pay him wages which amounted to the selling price of the product of only six hours of his labor. The difference between the value of production of six hours' labor and that of twelve hours' labor was the "surplus value" (after deducting all overhead expenses) and this should go into the pockets of the laborer and not of the capitalist. As to the re-investment of capital in labor-saving machinery whereby the workers could make a finished product by punching a button, that came about through the investment of ill-got gains and should be the problem and ownership of the state and not of any profit-

eer. The state should distribute products and, of course, surplus values. Marx also saw rent and interest as a part of the surplus value.

Theory of falling profits.—Marx felt further that after its initial stages of expansion, capitalism would fall into a succession of crises, one of which would be overproduction and competition, and the process would cause the capitalist to take less and less for his goods and therefore his profit would constantly fall. For a while capitalism could exploit new markets, but when all markets become saturated, there is widespread displacement of workers, unemployment, decrease in production and further exploitation of the workers which results in the inevitable class struggle.

Class struggle and revolution.—As Marx saw it, our forces of production and scientific know-how outstrip our relations of production or man's social wisdom. To illustrate: when under the feudal system new productive forces developed, social revolution ensued because the feudal system could not accommodate them. The capitalist system has now run its cycle and shows the same tendency toward rigidity, according to Marx; the new system of productive relations will be through public ownership of all means of production. Economic classes are organized on the basis of their participation in wealth production, and each class seeks to obtain for itself a larger portion of the income produced, with the dominant owning class always arrayed against those who threaten its property. In the beginning, the struggle is confined to the economic field, but once the dominant class is victorious, the political state and other institutions are consolidated by it. The outmoded economic class invariably refuses to surrender these institutions, and the emerging class is finally compelled to seize political power by forcible means. What

is more, within capitalism itself, Marx saw the seeds of its own destruction because, as the pace for profits quickens, more and more capitalists fail to meet the test and fall into the proletarian group. Inevitably there will be a polarization of the classes, and the proletariat will become bottom-heavy until the predominance of the proletariat is so strong that it will seize all means of production and set society aright by fashioning the political house to its choosing. The working class instead of any other group should do this, because it is most numerous and occupies the strategic position to paralyze industry. The resistance of the ruling class is so obstinate, however, that revolution is inevitable. Marx's notion of how the political transformation from capitalism to communism would come about is not clear and on an occasion or two he even stated that in some countries like the United States and possibly England and Holland the workers could obtain their objective by peaceful means.⁷

More than a theorist, Marx also participated in regimenting labor into a striking force. In 1847, when Marx was twenty-nine, he joined with Engels and drew up the *Communist Manifesto*—labor's call to action. He was also an active, though not the leading figure, in many of the communist International Congresses held in European capitals during the twenty-five years following the close of the American Civil War.

The revolution came in Russia in 1917. Lenin and the professional revolutionaries under his leadership infiltrated existing social, political, and labor organizations and the military forces. No one would deny that they have met with much success. Beginning in 1928, a series of five-year plans have brought about the industrialization of Russia and the collectivization of farming in a manner that has made Russia

one of the two great world powers. Her industry is geared to power, not consumer welfare. Her leaders have been recruited from the masses, but once their leadership has been established, they ruthlessly compel conformity.

Along with some successful predictions made by Marx should also be measured his errors. Rigorous examination of his ideas reveals a mixture of the true, the vague, and the false. Here at least are some notable failures: (1) There has been no polarization of the classes in all countries; instead a great "middle class" has arisen. (2) The workingman's lot has improved.⁸ (3) There has been a wider, not narrower, economic participation of all people through stock ownership.⁹ (4) There has been wider social and political influence through universal suffrage. (5) The revolution did not occur in a highly industrialized society but in a relatively backward agrarian state. (6) History is as much a testimonial to class cooperation as it is to class struggle. (7) The notion that all labor, even including reflective thinking, can be reduced to a common factor is unrealistic.¹⁰

Marx's was a monistic theory in quest of total solutions. If it had been pluralistic and had given ethics, religion, law, and the like their due, even while recognizing the importance of economics, many feel he would have made a more nearly correct analysis. In brief, we might note the Marx "scoreboard."

MARX SCOREBOARD

<i>Predictions Correct</i>	<i>Errors</i>
Monopolistic tendencies	No polarization of classes
Cycles of boom and depression	Improvement of labor economically and politically
Impact of science on industry	Regenerative power of capitalism
Growth of labor force	Revolution did not occur in an industrialized state
Creation of new problems	No state withering
	Rise of fascism
	Oversimplification

2. TOTALITARIAN FASCISM

Fascism is the second revolt against the western liberal way of life. It is the totalitarian organization of government and society by a single party dictatorship and it is intensely nationalistic, militaristic, and imperialistic as exemplified in Italy in 1922, Germany in 1933, Spain in 1939, Japan in 1930, and Argentina in 1943. I hope we should not add Egypt in 1956.

Communism has usually been associated with the poor, underdeveloped nations, whereas fascism has hit the richer, more advanced ones. Fascism is post-democratic and post-industrial. Democratic methods and experience have been used to muster mass support, and the more terroristic fascist movements have been the most popular and strongest.

In dealing with the problems industrialization brings about, fascism either overlooks or denies them, or it resolves all differences by force.

In practice, fascism has appealed to industrialists and land-owners, some of whom have paid heavily to the government. Support has also come from the lower middle classes, who dread the prospect of rejoining the proletariat, and fascism therefore propagandizes them. This "salarial" (as it is now sometimes called) is jealous of big business and fearful of big labor, but labor has organized into unions and union progress has been relatively faster than that of the white-collar salariat. The military and the unemployed are other groups favoring fascism. Fascism gives a sense of "belonging." Those who suffer from unemployment and failure frequently are not hurt by the economic fall as much as they are by a fall in prestige and by being nobodies in the lonely crowd. Fascism solves this by glorifying the state and frequently by putting a uniform with bright buttons on the forgotten unemployed man.

Fascism cuts across social groups; it does not look to a polarizing of classes. Fascists are nationalistic and chauvinistic, jingoistic and desirous of empire and conquest. Fascism appeals to all of the insecure and the resentment-ridden from all walks of life.

Professor Ebenstein in his recent book *Today's Isms* lists several traits of the individual who subscribes to the various political philosophies. He sees the fascist as one with emotional rigidity, limited imagination, tending to conform to orthodox practices, showing excessive concern for status and strength, and strong loyalty to incumbents and vehement hatred for the outsiders, with stress on discipline and obedience instead of freedom and spontaneity.¹¹

Elements of fascist doctrine include: (a) a distrust of reason with dogmatic taboos and a denial of those western foundations based upon Greek reason, Jewish monotheism, and Christian love; (b) a denial of basic human equality with men regarded as superior to women, soldiers superior to the civilian, and the party member above the non-party member; (c) a code of behavior often based on violence and encouragement of annihilation of the enemy, which stands in sharp contrast to Britain's "loyal opposition" whose leader is paid a salary for opposing Her Majesty's government; (d) a government by the elite—justified by the belief that people as a whole are not capable of governing themselves; (e) totalitarianism, imperialism, and racism—as we saw in Nazi Germany where the Nordic type was glorified and the Jews ostracized and even exterminated.

Fascism is not so all-absorbed with the economic interpretation of history as is communism. If capitalism would give the state strength, then the fascist would endorse it. In practice, however, syndicalism has been encouraged by the

organization of syndicates or unions so that neither the workers nor the state will control the means of production, but the syndicate, or the union, of each particular industry.

Fascism stresses equality of classes, but not individuals. A self-constituted elite should rule the state and the state would speak for a unified people and none will oppose it. Humanity en masse cannot rise high except by the expert mind and leadership. Heroic virtues of discipline and sacrifice are emphasized more than economic forces, and private enterprise is encouraged or permitted because it best serves the state.

3. DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM

The Greeks originated the expression "democracy" as the rule of the many as opposed to monarchy or aristocracy, the rule of one or the rule of the few. However, the Greeks recognized and employed the institution of slavery; hence democracy to them meant participation in the government only by the free male citizens of the state. Rome also accepted this republican approach to government (even, in theory, under the Empire), but with the fall of Rome there was an intellectual decline in Western Europe and democracy fell back.

Far in the lead in developing democracy as the New World knows it today was England, but even there it took over five hundred years to evolve. As early in 1215, Magna Carta made it clear that even a king was subject to some law and the concept of constitutionality was thereby recognized and was thereafter to be maintained; but at this time only the barons shared power with the king and it was almost four centuries more before the crown and the nobility lost their controlling power. By 1688 it was definitely established that

Parliament, composed of the Lords and Commons (elected by the people, albeit by a few), was superior to the king.

But even into the nineteenth century, British ideology was still far from pure democracy and the upper middle class ran the government. Then, beginning in 1832, a series of reform acts greatly extended the suffrage from some four percent in 1832 to virtually universal adult suffrage by 1927. Parliament ceased to be the exclusive organ of businessmen and landed barons, and for the past one hundred years there has been an outpouring of social legislation aiming generally at the greatest good for the greatest number. In the United States, Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, in particular, put into action governmental programs designed also for the benefit of the common man and not only the privileged classes.

To the Western World, democracy has come to mean a variety of things, all putting emphasis on the freedom and dignity of the individual. It has confidence in man and opposes all doctrines of caste; it regards gains of humanity as mass gains, attributable to the efforts of the many and not of the few, and hence believes such gains should be diffused as promptly as possible among the populace. It likes decisions arrived at by common counsel and not by arbitrary decree. Democracy means freedom of speech and press, and of religious worship, and many other civil rights; it means freedom of thought, and equality before the law, and the right to oppose government, to unionize and to move freely about. To paraphrase Judge Learned Hand's statement on liberty,¹² it is a spirit not too sure that it is right; it seeks to understand the minds of other men and women and the interests of all without bias; it envisions a kingdom where the least shall be heard and considered side by side

with the greatest. It likes logic, but it prefers experience; it places primary emphasis on the individual and accepts the state as his helpful instrument. It encourages voluntary associations of its citizens into groups of their own choosing. It emphasizes the means by which results are accomplished, and not just the results. It recognizes a "higher law" than that made by man. It believes in free discussion and broad tolerance of unorthodoxy.

In our own country, democracy has progressed under capitalism—its basic tenet being private ownership of property and its impelling force being the profit motive. It has developed a free market with competition serving as the prime regulator, with the state intervening to help to regulate more and more in the twentieth century. Its material success is unparalleled in all history, and it has successfully met the test of two great wars.

In the past quarter-century particularly, democratic capitalism in America has supported the welfare state. With minimum wage laws, workmen's compensation, the breakup of large estates through taxation, social security and health programs, our form of government today bears considerable resemblance to Britain's form of socialism.¹³

4. SOCIALISM

The term socialism is sometimes used to describe various beliefs in the communal use and ownership of property stretching back as far as the Greeks and in this usage is synonymous with communism. This is an anachronistic usage now, however, and today we associate the term with those who opposed the social pattern which emerged after the Industrial Revolution. In its totally unregulated beginnings, this revolution brought rapid wealth to the owners of new

factories, but created living conditions for workers which were sordid and disease-ridden. Forward-looking persons turned their thoughts to a social reorganization based on peaceful and evolutionary means.

Among these reformers none is more interesting than Robert Owen—an apprentice at the age of ten, owner of his own business at eighteen, and at twenty-eight a part-owner of the great New Lanark Mills in Scotland (and, incidentally, married to the former owner's daughter). At New Lanark, he set out to prove that his plant would operate more efficiently if the employees worked fewer hours. He improved housing and enforced new standards of cleanliness. The company store was turned to a non-profit basis and schooling was expanded. Education was the main hope of his program. Along with other monetary reformers, Owen thought that currency should be based on labor and that all costs should have a labor-time denominator. Crowned by encouraging success in his early program, he greatly expanded it at New Harmony, Indiana. There the community was housed in buildings forming a large rectangle with a common dining room and recreation room; outside the rectangle were the workshops and the fields; and all property was vested in the community. For a couple of years there was harmony, but then individualism filtered through and after another year the colony was dispersed into five smaller units, after which Owen had lost most of his fortune, and bade the colony farewell. He had left a career of certain success in business for his social experiments; but his atheism and belief in free divorces lost him prestige, even though his general influence has been lasting.

In one form or another, during the past fifty years, nearly all of the European nations have had a socialist government

for at least a few years. Frequently, as in New Zealand, Australia, and the Scandinavian countries, it did not arise in opposition to capitalism, but rather to place capital under government planning instead of under corporate directors. Generally speaking, socialism has grown up in countries with democratic capitalist backgrounds, so that socialism represents a rebellion of the child against the father, and not stranger against stranger; it stresses collective ownership of property where capitalism stresses individual ownership. In a democratic setting, it has sought to provide opportunity for the underprivileged classes; to end inequality at birth; to open education to all; to eliminate discrimination because of race, color, or religion; to maintain full employment; to regulate and reorganize the economy; to provide social security for the aged, sick, and infirm; and to build new cities.

Socialism differs from communism in that it is evolutionary whereas the latter is revolutionary; the communists work on one class, namely organized labor, whereas the socialists work on all classes, including the intelligentsia. The socialists are willing to experiment whereas communists tend to support a definitive and irrevocable plan. Socialism does not consider public ownership of property an end in itself but simply a means to an end. Communism has its temporary elite or ruling class, whereas socialism utterly rejects the idea.

Socialism has no manifesto and has developed differently in different countries. It has generally encouraged cooperation, not struggle, between men as brothers. It recognizes the inevitability of change, and would accomplish it through peaceful planning.

Socialists have accomplished much of their original program and today face something of an impasse. The welfare

state has stolen much of their thunder, and over-nationalization of industry is admittedly a danger to production. Eugene O. Golob, in a book on the "isms,"¹⁴ gives three major reasons why socialism has not become a significant political movement in America. First, the American economy has been sufficiently prosperous to prevent the formation of a large and continuously depressed proletariat; next, the rising demands of American labor have been increasingly met; and again, American culture has always been extremely hostile to theories.

CONCLUSION

The remarks offered here regarding these four major "isms" are briefly presented in the accompanying chart (see pp. 66-67). Such a "charting of the isms" offers an opportunity to note at a glance how dangerous it is to label any one set of characteristics as being specifically "communist," "socialist," "fascist," or "democratic." All of these political philosophies have some things in common and it is only by considering all aspects of any one of them that it can be fully understood. A realization of the complexity of this material and the dangers of oversimplification has been the purpose of this paper.

And finally, since political scientists throughout history have been dogged by persistent error, there is discouraging precedent for trying to reach conclusions. At this date, however, this much may be safely observed. With the defeat of Germany, Italy and Japan, and the eclipse of Peron's power in Argentina, the fascist state has lost much ground during the past quarter-century. It need not necessarily have been so, for if Hitler's scientists had developed the atomic warhead as soon and as well as they developed the V-2 rocket,

it is entirely possible, or even probable, that the fascist state would have won out in Europe and conceivably in America.

With the decline from first-rate leadership of England, it can also be safely said that socialism, which gained much ground in the past fifty years, has fallen back at mid-century.

The obvious fact is that two giants have emerged, one under totalitarian communism and the other under democratic capitalism. Neither has maintained the purity of its form, and much could be said as to how the welfare state has copied a great deal from socialism and how communism has found it necessary to employ capitalistic incentives to make its system work. The struggle between the giants has become intense, and the post-war gains of the communist state have been frightening. China and Japan, emerging from a sort of oriental medievalism, have been drawn into opposing camps. The Middle East is at the crossroads. And yet a real dilemma haunts the Kremlin, as has been made manifest by the uprisings in Hungary and the stirrings in Poland, caused by the contradictions between liberty and repression. In the nuclear age, Soviet science and industry must match our pace, and it is probable that to do this will require imagination and freedom which may sharpen the contradictions to the point of crisis. The tightly organized police state of Stalin cannot remain so tight if Soviet scientists are to be stimulated by contact with the outside world. To regiment or suppress the scientists may cause them to fall behind in progress and "gravitate into the quiet backwaters out of the main stream of useful work."¹⁵

Russia, however, has apparently developed a well equipped educational system putting heavy emphasis on technology, science, and research. In broadening the educational system, however, the critical mind must also develop and the

A CHART VIEW

<i>Ism</i>	<i>Historical</i>	<i>Religious</i>	<i>Economic</i>
Totalitarian Communism	Economic Interpretation of History Eventual triumph of Proletariat by revolutionary means	Anti-religious	Ownership of means of production by proletariat (but by state in Soviet Union)
Totalitarian Fascism	History used to glorify the state	Religion used to glorify the state	Private ownership of production under strict regulation of state (workers and industrialists organized into syndicates)
Democratic Capitalism	Critical of excessive governmental intervention	No fixed attitude but tending to be religious (and in U.S. separate from state)	Private ownership of means of production Laissez-faire (free market)
Democratic Socialism	Belief in the inevitability of change whether parliamentary or revolutionary	No fixed attitude (Christian Socialists emphasize religion)	Ownership of means of production for society's best welfare; some by state—some by cooperatives—some privately owned

OF THE ISMS

<i>Social</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Psychological</i>
Classless society (but in Soviet Union a society which tends to stratify on ability to produce)	Strong party organization to promote the cause of the proletarian revolution Party "leader" with tendency to be a dictator Denial of civil liberties	Fanatical devotion to party dogma which replaces religion Semi-deification of leaders in Soviet Union
Governing elite dominate over rest of society Military bias Racial bias in Italy and Germany	Dictatorship (usually acquired by unconstitutional or extraconstitutional means) Totalitarian No civil liberties	Excessively patriotic Semi-deification of leader Expansionist Excessively nationalistic
Social position determined by personal achievement and wealth	Democratic Extensive civil liberties Tendency toward welfare state in 20th century	General confidence in the ability of fellow citizens to participate intelligently in government
Distinctions created by wealth tend to be levelled by taxation	Democratic Extensive civil liberties Socialization through parliamentary procedures	Emphasis on brotherhood of man and liberalism; confidence in political ability of citizens

educated may try their wings on new ideology. Freedom engenders freedom and creates a mounting demand for more; if set strongly in motion in the Soviet state, freedom could bring about its complete downfall. So it remains to be seen whether the Soviet state can permit the freedom necessary to gain technological superiority or equality and yet keep that freedom in bounds so as to maintain the ideological basis of communism.

C. M. HUDSPETH

NOTES

1. Wilfred John Funk, *Word Origins and their Romantic Stories* (New York, 1954).
2. Louis Wasserman, *Modern Political Philosophies and What They Mean*, 2nd ed. (Garden City, New York, 1951).
3. Sidney Hook, *Marx and the Marxists* (New York, 1955), pp. 11-48.
4. Hubert Kay in an article entitled "Karl Marx" written for *Life* which appeared in 1948.
5. William Harlan Hale, "When Karl Marx Worked for Horace Greeley," *American Heritage*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (April, 1957), pp. 20-25.
6. Frederic Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*, quoted in an article by Warner Bloomberg, Jr., in *Commentary*, March, 1955.
7. William Ebenstein, *Today's Isms: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, Socialism* (New York, 1954), p. 10.
8. Compare the statements quoted above in the text from Engels' *Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844* with the labor situation prevailing in June, 1955, when the United Auto Workers won from Ford Motor Company and General Motors such benefits as: \$2.10 an hour for the common worker, the right to become a stockholder through periodic investment with the company matching 50¢ for the worker's dollar in its acquisition; a guaranteed wage whereby the worker would receive over 60% of his regular pay for a period of 26 weeks by means of the creation of a giant fund to insure its workability; pension benefits for retirement at 65; group insurance benefits up to \$6,400.00; hospitalization and surgical programs; time-and-a-half for Saturday work with guaranteed costs-of-living wage increases and with half-day holidays (in addition to the regular ones) on Christmas and New Year's Eve thrown in for good measure.

9. Ben Fairless, President of United States Steel, pointed out that the workers could gain control of the company by applying just their wage increase toward cost of stock acquisition for a period of seven years. *The Daily Worker*, unimpressed, hinted darkly he was trying to make a killing on some stock.
10. Hook, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-46.
11. Ebenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
12. Learned Hand, *The Spirit of Liberty* (New York, 1954).
13. The changing attitude toward the role of the American government toward the economic life of the nation can be illustrated by the following two examples.

“Our rulers will best promote the improvement of the people by strictly confining themselves to their own legitimate duties—by leaving capital to find its most lucrative course, commodities their fair price, industry and intelligence their natural reward, idleness and folly their natural punishment—by maintaining peace, by defending property, by diminishing the price of law, and by observing strict economy in every department of the State. Let the Government do this—the people will assuredly do the rest.” (Charles A. Beard, “The Myth of Rugged Individualism,” *Harper’s Magazine*, Vol. 164 [December, 1931], pp. 13-22.)

“ . . . The Congress hereby declares that it is the continuing responsibility of the federal government . . . to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining . . . maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.” (Employment Act of 1946 cited in Bailey, Samuel, and Baldwin, *Government in America* [New York, 1957].)
14. Eugen O. Golob, *The “Isms,” A History and Evaluation* (New York, 1954), p. 241.
15. Harrison E. Salisbury in an article entitled “The Dilemma that Haunts the Kremlin,” *New York Times Magazine*, January 27, 1957.

SHAKESPEARE'S SMALL LATIN*

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, before we share some thoughts on Shakespeare's education and the use his genius made of it, I want to thank you from my heart, and specially our President and Mrs. Houston, for the welcome which has made this place to me already what our Cambridge, England, was to Edmund Spenser, a kind mother, alma mater, and a queen, adorned "with many a gentle Muse and learned Wit."

A gentle Muse she was, and witty too, who chose that boy from Stratford, though he never was to study at a University, to write the best plays anybody in this world has ever written. She knew, of course, what pedantry and snobbery would make of such a choice, and smiles, I think, today at the suggestion that My Lord of Oxford, Francis Bacon, or her own beloved Kit Marlowe, could have done just what she wanted. No, Will Shakespeare, with his special gift of loving-kindness and imaginative human understanding, was the boy for her, and Stratford was the school for him. She knew that just the modest store of learning Stratford School could offer him, no more, no less, would amply serve her purposes for him, and so, through him, for all of us. To-day at last, thanks to the pioneering zeal and dedicated labour of a notable American, Professor T. W. Baldwin, we can speak with confidence about the method and curriculum of such a school, and gladly join with Dr. George Trevelyan, the most eminent and most humane of our historians, in "humble, hearty thanks to both the medieval founders and the educational reformers" (men like Colet and Erasmus, Cheke and Ascham), who made such a school as Stratford Grammar

* A public lecture delivered at the Rice Institute on December 17, 1956.

School available for such a boy as Shakespeare. Yes, it was a gentle, witty Muse who chose that boy, that school.

Good schooling by itself would not have been enough. If poetry and drama were to flourish, more, much more was needed; and to Shakespeare, in his time of life, much more was given. First, an audience of music-lovers, well acquainted with varieties of elegant and often subtle vocal composition, fit and eager to enjoy and to appreciate the music of the spoken word. Next, an audience already passionately fond of stories told in verse, and notably in ballads: even Autolycus, we see, contributed; so did the "groundlings" generally, accustomed as they were to the rude, healthy vigour of theatricals, not only at the Court and in the Inns of Court, not only in the popular theatres, but throughout the land in schools and universities, and everywhere, on festal days, in churchyards and on village greens as well as in the streets and squares of cities. Finally, above all, Shakespeare's native language, just in time, but only just in time for him, had reached its highest power and richness, flexibility and beauty. All was ready for the master spirit and he came.

At every birth of man [John Masefield writes] a spirit takes
Flesh for a pilgrimage across our night.
He comes with beauty, wisdom and delight,
And gathers sorrow, folly and misuse,
And, if not murdered, dies of our mistakes.
Might not the birth of every man be hailed
As a divine appearance come to lead
Men to the living brotherhood they need?

Shakespeare was born in 1564, and so was Marlowe, rather more than half a century since, in the dedication to Archbishop Warham of his Latin version of the *Hecuba*, Erasmus prophesied for England "poets of her own, swans that will sing so tunefully, posterity will listen." Now fulfillment was at hand.

Philip Sidney was a boy of ten at Shrewsbury, Spenser about twelve, at school in London, when, at Canterbury Marlowe, and at Stratford Shakespeare, started on their pilgrimage of life. And in the summer of that year of years their Queen Elizabeth rode into Cambridge with a brilliant cavalcade, including William Cecil, once a teacher of the classics at St. John's, but now Her Majesty's Chief Secretary and our Chancellor. He wrote to us beforehand courteously to say, we need not trouble to find lodging for him. He would stay with his "old nurse, St. John's"—a happy augury for us to-day, with our high hopes for your creation here of residential Colleges. *Floreat, floreant, floreant.*

Soon after her arrival, I suppose, the Queen will hear the voices of our young-eyed choristers, singing a "little round or catch" still cherished in our archives:

Allegra, Anglia allegra
Vivat Elizabeth Regina
Honi soit qui mal y pense
Let all faithful hearts her noble name advance.

English, Latin, French, Italian—almost, not quite, the story of our people and our language—though the debt to Greece and Palestine, in words at any rate, is not acknowledged.

On her way to King's, however, as Elizabeth rides on, past Queen's, from time to time she checks her horse, while a young man steps from his place and, reverently kneeling, offers verses to his Queen. Most of them offer Latin, but one youth, a certain Thomas Drant, just graduated M.A. of St. John's, has had the honour of composing—and now offers to Her Majesty—an English poem.

Not a very good one, you may think, and certainly Tom Drant was not the Muse's favourite. In later life he was that dreary sort of clergyman who preaches with fanatical en-

thusiasm against everybody's sins except his own. But now he's young, and we can link kind thoughts of him, at work upon his poem in a bare, bleak chamber at St. John's, with memories of a far greater poet writing on the Eve of the Nativity in just such another room at Christ's.

So let us listen, very kindly, to the first few lines of Mr. Drant's effusion:

Ye Kings who rule on land and seas
And you, infernal ghosts,
Bear witness now we have a Queen
In whom Dame Nature boasts.

Not very happy? But we must be just. Were Drant our pupil we might say "Dame Nature, yes, a lovely lady; that's a good idea, a happy phrase. But those infernal ghosts? Why *did* you drag them in?" "Because," he might reply, "you told me to read Ovid, Sir, and Seneca, and learn the value of rhetorical antithesis." "Ah, yes, we see. Kings, rulers both on land and sea and in the depths, Dame Nature and our Queen. So that's your sequence? Very well, what next?"

And Cambridge too . . .

His voice has changed. His heart is speaking:

And Cambridge too thou dost enclose,
High thanks to Him above,
A Woman whom the world adores
And God Himself doth love.

At the moment when he wrote those lines our Mr. Drant became, in his own humble way, a poet. From the pomp and pride of rulers over land and sea and in the bowels of the earth he lifted first his thought to that fair lady, Nature, honouring his Queen, and then his heart, in thankfulness, to Him above, and saw his Sovereign Lady, simply, beautifully, as a woman whom God loves.

I think the Muse is smiling, and I think the Queen smiles too, as she rides on.

Arrived at King's, long speeches from the Seniors, and the Queen's reply in Latin, then service in the Chapel, and then supper at the Lodge. But no rest yet for her. Back she goes, and is to go on three successive summer evenings to the antechapel, where she sits, surrounded by her courtiers, until nearly midnight while the boys of Cambridge act their plays for her. Good queens work hard, we know.

What plays? A Comedy by Plautus; next on the second night, a Chronicle in English about good King Hezekiah—a compliment, perhaps, or else a gentle hint to our good Queen, since Hezekiah was particularly good and therefore must have been a protestant. That was a school play, written for his boys by Udall, once Headmaster of our sister College, Eton. That, perhaps, although he later moved to Westminster, was why we chose his play. He was the author of *Ralph Royster Doyster*.

But the third night was a triumph for the *Dido* of John Rightwyse, once a Fellow of the College. He had come to us from Eton as long ago as 1508, only two years after the Queen's grandfather, King Henry VII, and her great-grandmother, the Lady Margaret, had visited our then unfinished Chapel and, at sight of it, we fancy, had been moved to that munificence, continued by her father, Henry VIII, which had enabled us to finish, furnish and adorn the fabric. Rightwyse became a Fellow while the work was still in hand, but left us early to teach school, at first as Usher (second master) to the famous Lily at St. Paul's. He helped him in the editing and the revision of the Latin Grammar of which Shakespeare had such vivid and amusing memories. He also married Lily's daughter Dionysia and in due course succeeded Lily as High Master. His *Dido* was performed at school in honour of his

patron Wolsey, probably in 1527. Some say the King himself was present. Four years later Rightwyse lost his post—officially “for negligence.” We wonder. Wolsey died under a cloud in 1530. Anyhow Rightwyse died soon after that, and it is good to know his College, in the year of Shakespeare's birth, still thought of him and furbished up his play to be enacted for the Queen. She liked it, and she gave Tom Preston, the young man who took the part of Dido, first her royal hand to kiss, and then a purse of gold, some say a pension. Preston flourished, became Master of a Cambridge College (Trinity Hall) and wrote the play immortalised by Shakespeare when he made his Falstaff rail upon Prince Hal “in King Cambyses' vein”!

Plautus, the Chronicle of Hezekiah, *Dido*—what a programme! On the fourth night we had meant to offer a Greek Tragedy, the *Ajax*, but three days of academic exercises and three nights of undergraduate theatricals had proved enough. In royal fashion Queen Elizabeth packed up and disappeared. First she rode off to luncheon with the Bishop of the diocese, then on to sup and sleep at Hinchinbrooke, Sir Henry Cromwell's seat. I don't suppose she dreamt about the future of the Cromwells, but certainly she had a vexing evening. The boys of Cambridge followed her, and on the way they thought, “She won't want any old Greek play. She'll be wanting something modern.” So they gave her, when she graciously allowed it, after supper, a farce of their own composition, making fun of certain bishops, cloistered by the Queen for certain reasons, in the Tower. Her Majesty was not amused. It was a gross impertinence. Besides, the King of Spain's ambassador was there, her guest at supper. So she rose in wrath, cried, “Take away the lights!” and left the boys in darkness and in dire disgrace.

Meanwhile at Canterbury Marlowe, and at Stratford

Shakespeare, sleeping in their cradles, little dreamt, you may suppose, that presently Kit Marlowe was to write an English play of *Dido*, and Shakespeare a much better comedy than Plautus, on a Plautine theme, the *Comedy of Errors*, and a Chronicle of a good English King, the same who founded that same Chapel, where the Queen had watched the Chronicle of Hezekiah; and, most wonderful of all, a masterpiece in which a student fresh from Wittenberg would ask to have a speech recited from a play about the story that Aeneas told to Dido, and a Tragedy enacted in the course of which a King would rise in consternation, and would cry, "More lights, more lights!" Do children dream before they learn to speak? Who knows? The mothers? Or the child-psychologists? Whatever be the answer, when that master spirit came to us, his audience and opportunity were waiting for him.

And at Oxford, in that year of Shakespeare's birth, something was happening far more important than our Cambridge festival. A young Welshman, Thomas Jenkins, son of an old servant in the household of Sir Thomas White (sometime Lord Mayor of London, now a wealthy squire in Shropshire) was preparing for a greater honour than Tom Preston ever had. He was to teach Will Shakespeare his small Latin and less Greek. His father's master, good Sir Thomas White, had founded in the University of Oxford a College dedicated to Saint John, for the specific purpose of preparing teachers to serve God in church and school. He had noticed that Tom Jenkins was a boy of promise and had written to his College, "Pray accept this boy, and educate him, please, at my expense." So Jenkins went to Oxford, did well, was made a Fellow, and presently asked leave to go away and teach in school. Where he went at first we don't know, but we do

know that he found his way to Stratford and was Usher there about the time when Shakespeare learnt his accidence from Lily's Grammar, and became Headmaster just about the time when Shakespeare would be tackling Mantuan and learning to love Ovid, Cicero and Virgil.

Some of our learned wits have doubts about all this. They ask for proof, not merely probability. And even such a good Shakespearean as Mr. Ivor Brown assures us that, wherever Shakespeare went to school, it bored him and he didn't like his teachers. But what proof have we of that? Witness, says Mr. Brown, his portraits of them in the plays, and his twin pictures of the whining schoolboy, creeping like a snail to school, and of these golden lads and lasses, trooping out with happy faces to a sunshine holiday. But surely all of us have done it. It's just human nature. So did Shakespeare. We *did* creep a little on our way to school—and some of us still do so, even here, at the Rice Institute. We *do* troop out with sunshine faces to our holidays. What does that prove?

You will forgive me if I tell you of a personal experience, which gave and gives me pleasure. Once a Cambridge boy, arranging for a talk I was to give, and anxious to secure an audience, brought me a drawing of myself, a queer old creature, but, I thought, a bit amusing, and asked if he might use it in his notice of my talk. "Of course," I said, "you may." But presently he brought it back, as a souvenir, explaining that, on second thoughts, he hadn't used it, because "some of those who saw it might not be so young of heart as you and I." Does that prove that they were bored and didn't like their teachers? On the contrary, if any teacher is remembered by a pupil with the vivid and affectionate amusement Shakespeare got from the originals of his Sir Hugh (the Welshman,

Sir Hugh Evans!) and Sir Nathaniel, yes, and even Holofernes (though he's more like a professor than most schoolmasters), he has reason to give humble, hearty thanks.

Was Shakespeare bored by Jenkins, the Welsh schoolmaster? Shakespeare himself has told us. In the *Merry Wives*, when Mistress Page brings her son Will, and tells Sir Hugh, "My husband says my son profits nothing at his book," we surely recognize at once a memory of home and school. Father did say that sort of thing and grumble; and mother said, "Very well, O.K., I'll speak to Mr. Jenkins." So she does, and a delightful scene ensues. "Come hither, Will. Hold up your head." Whatever Mr. Brown may say, this William isn't whining. He's not in the least like a snail as he puts up his head, for mother's sake and his own dignity, and tackles Jenkins—alias Sir Hugh. And at the climax, when Sir Jenkins-Evans says, "If you forget your quis and your quaes and your quods, you must be preeched," which means, put down your trousers and be spanked, Will Page is perfectly aware that Evans doesn't mean to "preech" him. Moreover, if he awaits a moment, as he will if the producer knows his business, after the expected "Go your ways and play," he'll hear his mother saying, "He's a better scholar than I thought," and Evans answering, "He *has* a good sprag memory." We may be sure Will loved that phrase, remembered it for life, and laughed to think how right old Jenkins was, and how absurd.

Already, long before Will Shakespeare and Will Page had fully mastered *hic, haec, horum*, they began to use their little stock of learning by memorising and translating maxims such as "Sleep, Death's image," "Time, Grief's doctor," "Friendship above all," "Whom Fortune cockereth, she maketh him a fool." That last stock theme gave Touchstone his retort to Jaques, "Call me not fool till heaven hath sent

me Fortune," and will make us tremble when Macbeth writes to his wife, "They met me in the day of success."

Presently these same boys will be writing essays on such themes, but much more fun and much more fruitful for them will be reading with the teacher's help selected passages, and later on, whole books by Latin authors, Mantuan at first, then perhaps some of Virgil's *Eclogues*, and then Ovid, stories chosen wisely not from *Fasti* or *Heroides*, which can be difficult and boring too, nor, for good reason, from *Ars Amatoria*, but from that treasury of lively and delightful tales about all sorts of gods and goddesses and mortals, *Metamorphoses*. As for good old Mantuan, how true it is, as Holofernes says, "Who understandeth thee not, loves thee not." Thanks to that comment, we can almost hear the teacher solemnly declaiming—

Fauste, precor gelida quando pecus omne sub umbra
Ruminat . . .

while his little flock gets drowsy, as it will. But Ovid wakes both class and teacher, and can kindle the imagination not of Shakespeare only but of many boys less gifted. Only, it takes of course a boy of genius, with a kind heart and a good sprag memory to notice and recall in later life how shrewd old Holofernes was, though so ridiculous and such a pedant, to describe so perfectly the world of difference between the soporific pastures of that good old monk and Ovid's elegance and facility, his golden cadence, his surprising "jerks of invention," and above all his "odoriferous flowers of fancy."

Shakespeare himself has given us an illustration in the *Taming of the Shrew* of how Elizabethan teachers used to introduce their boys and girls to such delights. Lucentio has come, you may remember, courting his Bianca, disguised

as a Latin tutor, and is merrily competing for her favour with a rich old suitor who pretends to be her music-master.

Books were scarce in those days, so the teacher has one, not the pupil. And the method of instruction is quite different from what is customary nowadays, even in quite good schools. The master doesn't tell his pupils to "prepare" a passage and then "put them on," in nervous apprehension, to translate. On the contrary, he reads the passage through aloud, first line by line and sentence after sentence, stopping to translate each phrase and give such explanations as seem helpful. Then he reads it through again in Latin and in English, and finally, but not before he's given all of them *his* version and *his* comments, he will ask his questions, calling on first one and then another to translate and comment. That was the method, and I think a good one, in Elizabethan schools.

With that explanation, let us listen to Bianca's Latin lesson. It would shock Sir Hugh and Sir Nathaniel, for the versions of the Latin offered by Lucentio and later echoed by his pupil are, to say the least of it, surprising—jerks of invention, flowers of fancy, if you will, but certainly not accurate translations.

Lucentio opens his book and Bianca innocently asks, "Where left we last?" Clearly this is not Lucentio's first visit.

Lucentio. Here, madam:

Hic ibat Simois; haec est Sigeia tellus;

Hic steterat Priami regia celsa senis.

Had Lucentio been Mr. Jenkins, he might well have given his translation thus: "Here flowed Simois; this is the land of Sigeum; here had stood the lofty palace of the old King Priam."

What Lucentio does give is very different.

"Construe," says Bianca, and Lucentio begins: "*Hic ibat*, as I told you before." How often Mr. Jenkins had used that phrase! "*Simois*, I am Lucentio." "*Sigeia tellus*, disguised thus to get your love." So it goes on till old King Priam's palace towers above the plain: "*Regia celsa senis*, that we may beguile the old pantaloon."

Surely, throughout that lovely scene, that merry Latin lesson, which will end with sweet Bianca's wonderful, "I know you not. . . . I trust you not. . . . Despair not," some of us remember what a joy it was, what fun for us at school, to have our first encounter with the "sweet and witty soul" of Ovid.

Ovid was Shakespeare's favourite at school and in his prentice days, and Shakespeare never lost that love, though what he learnt at school of Virgil was to be, I think, the seed of a devotion even more inspiring, more profound. Even so, as Mr. L. P. Wilkinson has told us in his admirable study of the whole Ovidian tradition (*Ovid Recalled*, pp. 419 ff.), though all Elizabethan poets quoted Ovid, it was Shakespeare who knew best how to value him. The spirit of his poesy, the soul of it, in fact, lives for us more in several of the plays than in the early poems. In *The Tempest*, for example, and the *Midsummer Night's Dream*, Puck and Ariel, with their attendant spirits and the mortals whom they tease and puzzle, would be quite at home in Ovid's world of fancy. We can all agree on that, but some of us may think that for the miracle which changed the stuff of Greene's pedestrian *Pandosto* into the grace and beauty of the *Winter's Tale*, we owe, and Shakespeare owed, to Ovid, more, much more than that. Essentially the *Winter's Tale* is not the story of Leontes or Polyxenes or anybody else, except two lovely, loving ladies, lost and found, Hermione and Perdita, the

mother and the maid. Long before Shakespeare, Dante in the *Earthly Paradise* had seen a lady plucking flowers and heard her song and thought of what Proserpina had been, "when her mother lost her and she lost her spring—her primavera." Even so, wherever Shakespeare first read Ovid's story of Proserpina and Ceres—his loveliest, I think—whether at school or later, doesn't so much matter. Certainly the loveliness of Ovid's Vale of Enna and the sweet simplicity of his Proserpina, gave Shakespeare, and can give us all, if we accept it, both the promise of the simple joys of that sheep-shearing festival in Warwickshire or, if you please, Bohemia, and with it something more, the deeply moving pathos of it and its relevance to what, in spite of all machinery, is still our intimate concern, the miracle and mystery of birth and love and suffering, the miracle and mystery of life and growth and death.

Perpetuum ver est.

There is eternal spring. While in that grove
Proserpina played and gathered violets . . .
Dis came, and saw, and loved, and seized her,
almost in one moment.

That is our own, our universal story. Most of us already have good cause to know it. All, I think, some day, somewhere, will have to learn it. Anyhow, generation after generation of the men and women who once worshipped at Eleusis loved it and found comfort in it, and today the hearts of men and women, whether kneeling at Our Lady's shrine or simply thinking of some loved one who was "gathered," can still find help and just a little comfort from that ancient story of the mother and the maid.

O Proserpina

For the flowers that frightened thou letst fall.

Territa is Ovid's word; "frighted" is Shakespeare's own. I think the crowning beauty of this lovely scene is Perdita's

"I was not much afeared" after the old King's storm of anger and his threats had seemed, but only seemed, to mean the end of happiness for her and for her Florizel.

Daffodils that take
The winds of March with beauty, violets dim,
But sweeter than the lids of Juno's eyes
Or Cytherea's breath; pale primroses
That die. . . .

"Violets dim . . . pale primroses"? Virgil, we see, has helped as well as Ovid. *Pallentes violas* is Virgil's phrase, not Ovid's (see *Ecl.* II, 45 ff.), and I like to think that these "pale" primroses that die unmarried ere they can behold bright Phoebus in his strength, owe something to the Muse of Virgil, and the spirit which dictated those great lines, beloved by Dante also:

*Tu Marcellus eris—manibus date lilia plenis
Purpureos spargam flores.*

And my sweet love,
To strew him o'er and o'er.
What, like a corse?
No, like a bank for love to lie and play on,
Not like a corse, or if, not to be buried
But quick and in my arms.

Certainly Shakespeare, who loved Ovid, none the less loved Virgil too, and in Ophelia's flower-speeches and the Queen's story of her death and loving tribute at her grave, there are still touches that remind us both of Perdita and of Marcellus.

I thought thy bride-bed to have deck'd, sweet maid,
And not have strewed thy grave.

As for Laertes',

Lay her in the earth,
And from her fair and unpolluted flesh
May violets spring,

there is no doubt this echoes one great line of Persius, the most difficult of Latin satirists and the least likely to be read

in schools. Was it quoted somewhere in a note on Virgil or on Ovid? Or perhaps in a book of extracts? Or did Mr. Jenkins or, much later, did Ben Jonson quote it, and did Shakespeare think, "A lovely phrase"? Who knows? Not I. Not, perhaps, even Mr. Baldwin.

What we do know, thanks again to Mr. Baldwin, is that three books and the best of the *Aeneid* were quite certainly all read at school: Book II, the story that Aeneas told to Dido of his own experience on that last tragic night of Troy; Book IV, Dido's own Tragedy; Book VI, the story of the hero's journey to the shades, all three were used and understood as well as loved by Shakespeare, often better understood by him than by most modern scholars. He has vivid memories too of parts of Cicero. Witness the moonlit scene at Belmont, with its exquisite Ovidian Prelude which begins with Troilus, his soul, and ends with Jessica's exquisite

In such a night
Did young Lorenzo swear he loved her true
And stole her soul?

and with Lorenzo's gracious "He forgave it her."

That Prelude, with its introduction of the soul at the beginning and forgiveness at the end, is a fitting Prelude to the sequel, the return of Portia, the loving comedy about the ring, and the last words of reconciliation—when Bassanio for his part swears by his soul and Antonio swears by his and Portia asks forgiveness. The whole act in fact is spoken music and the greatest wonder of it is the organ music of Lorenzo's speech which lifts us to the music of the spheres, blending with subtle memories of Scipio's Dream from Cicero and of Anchises' great discourse in Elysium the same theme as the Prelude and Conclusion of the whole enchanting episode, the Soul and Harmony.

Shakespeare knew and loved his Classics. Hamlet himself,

fresh from the Wittenberg of Shakespeare's fancy—very much like Oxford—proves it once again. He can quote Juvenal, can hold us all entranced by meditation on a school theme (from the *Tusculans*), "To be or not to be"; and just because he vividly remembers Virgil, he will ask the players for a speech "he chiefly loved from Aeneas' tale to Dido." It is delightful to observe that, when he gives the cue for the speech, Hamlet himself gets it wrong. He begins with a reference to what poor Dido said to her Aeneas when he left her: "Your mother must have been a Hyrcanian tigress!" So Hamlet begins the speech, "The rugged Pyrrhus, like the Hyrcanian beast," and corrects himself at once, "The rugged Pyrrhus, he whose sable arms, *et cetera*."

So well did Shakespeare know the detail of the poem. But it was the meaning of the poet that he understood much better than more modern critics. Why did Hamlet choose that speech? Not simply because he saw the play at Wittenberg, and liked it—though it was caviar to the general. But because he knew that Virgil's hero, even in the story of himself as Virgil makes him tell it, is the tale of how, throughout that dreadful night, he had been shirking the plain duty laid on him by Hector's ghost—to save his father and his son—to save the gods of Troy—but not to fight, because the cause is lost and Troy must live through him.

That is why Hamlet chose that speech, and he remembers how, at the sound of Hecuba's appeal and at the sight of Priam's body, Aeneas did at last remember duty and went home to do it. "Then, then, for the first time, o'erwhelmed by a fierce horror, I stood aghast. I seemed to see my own dear father's form. . . ." *Obstipui. Subiit cari genitoris imago*.

Hamlet remembered that, and so, just at that point, when Hecuba's cry "would have made milk the burning eyes of heaven," if the gods cared at all, he let Polonius stop the

player and dismissed the company with his accustomed courtesy, then railed upon himself. "What's Hecuba to him or he to Hecuba?"

Erasmus' prophecy indeed came true. "Small Latin"? Yes, perhaps, by Jonson's standard. But poets have a way of understanding poets.

So much for the small Latin. What about Greek? Here even Mr. Baldwin seems to droop and murmur, "Less . . . what worlds away!" Shakespeare had, I think, at school some chapters of a Gospel, probably some snatches of Theocritus and Hesiod, remembered since he loved their music, and possibly a very little Homer, not appreciated, for he clearly did not know the last books of the *Iliad* and so could never like Achilles. Some passages of Lucian he had, and some Isocrates, as well as anecdotes and aphorisms. Not very much, but it all counts; and after school he added to it certainly, perhaps as a teacher somewhere for a time, or as a servant who became a friend in a great house. We do not know. But anyhow, quite certainly, I think, he added more in later years, once Plutarch had inspired him, as Professor J. A. K. Thompson has convincingly assured us, with a new and true and really Greek conception of a tragic hero. Then, not till then, he wrote the tragedies which earned him Jonson's tribute, just and generous, though much misunderstood. He was indeed the peer of Aeschylus and Sophocles, because, although he had "small Latin and less Greek," and though "his matter nature be,"

His Art doth give the fashion

. . . [And] the race

Of Shakespeare's mind and manners brightly shines

In his well turned and true-filed lines.

His style in fact reflects a high poetic ancestry. That is Ben Jonson's final verdict. It is true.

J. T. SHEPPARD

INTO NEW LANDS:
THE PRINCIPLES OF NAVIGATION*

DR. HOUSTON, Members of the Class of 1957, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am truly honored to be your guest on this occasion. Because of its high ideals, the Rice Institute has long enjoyed the respect of the entire academic world. Because, too, of my own warm affection and great esteem for your President, I responded with pleasure to his invitation to join you this evening.

Dr. Houston and I met first in the winter of 1927-28 as postdoctoral students of physics in Munich, Leipzig and Berlin. To you who are about to graduate from college, a span of thirty years must seem to have its roots buried in antiquity. To Dr. Houston and me, and to the older members of this audience, 1927 was only yesterday. And something of a case may be made for each of these points of view.

Certainly it is true that in the long perspective of history, thirty years is an almost imperceptible interval. But events have transpired in these *particular* years which have changed the tempo of time and the very meaning of its measure. The great river of human affairs seems suddenly to have come upon a stretch of steep falls and cataracts, and is now rushing on towards a new world unlike anything man has known before. Never before our time has the character of our globe as a habitation for man been altered so much in so short a span. From this point of view, 1927 was indeed a long time ago.

The year 1927 stood almost midway between the two most devastating wars of history. I am not competent to analyze

* The principal address at the Forty-fourth Commencement of the Rice Institute, May 31, 1957.

the factors that have contributed to these terrible conflicts of our century, nor to assess the responsibility. The immediate causes clearly have been economic and political.

But underlying these convulsive movements of our time has been the striving of great peoples to adjust to a new existence made possible by the onrushing development of science and technology. Within this single century man's power to direct the forces of nature both to useful and to destructive purposes has multiplied a thousandfold. Within the lifetime of you who are graduating here this evening there has been an almost explosive growth in the technology at our command. So swift indeed has been the rise of science and engineering as mighty shapers of our society, and of all civilization, that many still fail to comprehend the breadth and strength of their influence. Let me give some substance to this point.

By its triumphs over disease, science has notably increased the normal expectancy of life and thereby affected the balance of populations. It is estimated, for example, that one person out of every twenty who have ever lived is alive today. The effective dimensions of the globe have been shrunk by the ease and rapidity of transportation and communications. Our generation has seen a truly stupendous expansion of industry, both in the volume of business and even more spectacularly in the variety of products. These in turn have contributed enormously to the material comforts of life. Science in agriculture has multiplied the fertility of our land and is effecting a major readjustment between town and country. City planners, in fact, are predicting that by 1975 the population of our metropolitan regions may be 70% again as large as it is today, in fact, with a resulting total urbanized area three times its present extent. It is difficult at this

moment, consequently, to foresee the ultimate form of the American city; we can be sure only that it will differ vastly from the city of today.

Finally, I would remind you of profound changes that have begun to affect the processes of industry and commerce. Indeed, we are on the verge of a second industrial revolution far more dramatic than the first. Old trades will disappear, of course; but for every job lost a dozen new ones may emerge, in service as well as production, challenging human skill and imparting variety and new interest to human labor.

In these few words I have hoped to convey to you only a suggestion of the magnitude of the revolution that is being wrought through progress in science. I well realize that it has become almost a commonplace to speak of technological innovation in this way. But despite all that has been written and said, I am obsessed by the thought that there is to this day still too little comprehension of the total extent of the changes in which the world is engaged.

There are, of course, in all this history of change, fearful implications for our future. The other evening at dinner I heard a distinguished diplomat remark with deep emotion and sincerity that the world would have been a better place had the atom never been discovered. He thought it now most unlikely that his children would live out their natural lives. But the atom does exist, has always existed, and by manifest destiny man was bound to discover it. The atom of itself is not evil. Neither is it good, although science—in everything it has given us—has increased man's opportunities for good. But the power of good lies with man himself and with his capacity for wisdom and moral judgment, his will to exploit his intellectual and spiritual resources for the welfare of mankind.

I am reminded of the old legend of Gutenberg and the invention of printing. It is told that one day as Gutenberg stood looking down upon his type with pride in his great discovery, the devil appeared before him and in a vision revealed to him all the evil that was to befall man in ages to come through the printed page—the slander and calumny, lies and obscenity, incitement to riot and war. In a fury of remorse Gutenberg caught up a hammer and was about to destroy his precious type. But there came to him at that moment an angel, and in another vision he saw the greatness of books as the record of all that man has said and thought and done that is noble or true or beautiful. Each man might now turn to his own Bible to seek consolation and hope in times of trouble; in history he might read the lessons of the past; in the rhythm and imagery of poetry his spirit would be stirred by the beauty of this world; and in philosophy he might discover the deeper meanings of life.

As it has been with printing, so may it also be with the atom and with the multitude of momentous discoveries that science is now showering upon us. You of this Class of 1957 should view the prospect not in a dark mood of alarm and despair but in optimistic terms of opportunity and challenge. There are gargantuan problems to be resolved, it is true, before the world can achieve political, economic and social equilibrium; but I, for one, am confident that they will be resolved, and that the difficulties and complexities of your existence will be more than offset by the challenge of new powers. Indeed, I envy you the intellectual adventures that lie ahead. We need waste no time in regretting an age that is now gone forever, but must look rather to the future.

Whether this future is to prove better or worse than the

past will depend wholly on our own efforts. We can only be sure that it will be different. We have been caught up in a great stream of technological development and are being swept forward into new lands. We cannot stem that tide. I do believe that we can navigate. Indeed I have faith that we *can* direct the forces of destiny and in significant measure determine the shape of things to come. Without that faith and confidence, your outlook on this Commencement Day would be most somber.

Now the basic resource that must sustain us in this adventure into the future is the common education of our people. In fact it has been said that civilization is a race between education and catastrophe. This week from schools and colleges all over the land, the Class of 1957 moves out to take its place in the line. The success with which *you* deal with the problems ahead will be governed in large measure by whatever wisdom my generation has exercised in the planning of your education. You in turn must shortly assume responsibility for those who come after. The welfare of this nation—and indeed the peace of the world—will be profoundly influenced by your concern for the importance of higher learning.

At every level of the American school system we are confronted today by perplexing and difficult problems. There is a shortage of buildings to accommodate the surging growth of population. There is an appalling shortage of teachers qualified to meet our more exacting demands. Among educators themselves there are deep differences of opinion as to the function of the common public school, differences as to the appropriate nature of the curriculum or the process of teaching.

At the root of all our concern, moreover, is the funda-

mental dilemma of numbers—of how to reconcile our dream of universal opportunity in education with a pressing need to cultivate excellence. It is imperative that we learn to take better account of the enormous spectrum of human ability, interests and initiative. Truly democratic education imposes upon us the duty to help each individual make the most of his abilities. We must recognize, therefore, the obligation of a democratic people in the interest of its own survival to seek out and educate the notably gifted, the industrious and the ambitious, the most promising of its human resources for spiritual and intellectual leadership.

These are among the most meaningful and difficult questions of our day, and with this Commencement they become your problems too. Since you cannot escape them, I trust you will seek to resolve them with all the intelligence at your command.

And so from these allusions to broad issues let me turn to comment briefly on engineering and the arts in the context of a liberal education for our time.

Engineering education as it commonly exists today is a product of the mid-nineteenth century. It was designed for a more elementary technology and a simpler society. As such it has provided a rather rudimentary training in mathematics and the physical sciences, a meager amount of general education, and the essentials of some specialized branch of engineering. At its best the curriculum has been fundamental and thorough; at worst, heavily vocational. While this plan has been basically sound for the years gone by, the complexities of modern technology and the complete transfiguration of modern society confront us with an entirely new range of requirements. The traditional patterns of engineering education are in large measure outmoded and inadequate.

Our first task, as it seems to me, is to take better stock of the vast variety of activities encompassed under the title of engineer. When we refer to the alarming shortage of engineers, we have in mind a wide range of occupations that begins with research and development and extends through design and production, into sales and service, and on to the highest levels of industrial management. Every part of this spectrum can have dignity and importance and each contributes in a particular way to the national good. I do not believe, however, that one and the same plan of engineering education can serve both the aims of immediate utility and the highest aspirations of the profession.

The time has now come, in fact, when the engineering educator must differentiate more clearly and firmly between the engineer and the technologist. Because the great problems of engineering can no longer be dealt with in isolation from the needs and affairs of people and human institutions, I am moved by the vision of a new and higher role for the engineer in the changing world I have portrayed for you. But if the engineers of the future are to provide the leadership that we shall desperately need, then technical competence is not enough; they must also be educated men. At the same time, it has become manifestly impossible within the brief undergraduate span both to train for technical competence and to educate young men and women for the grave responsibilities of leadership.

Education is a costly investment in time and money and we must not lightly add to that burden. But for the engineer of the future there seems to be no alternative course. No longer can we afford to substitute mere mastery of techniques for professional competence.

And now, finally, to these comments on engineering edu-

cation I would add that our need to strike a new balance in the teaching of the liberal arts is, if anything, even more acute. As we have come to require the scientist and engineer to understand the social and cultural forces he affects and is influenced by, so must we expect the liberal arts student to understand the spirit and meaning of science. Science has become an intimate and influential part of our culture, and no one born into today's world can escape its impact on the changing pattern of civilization.

The health of our national economy is bound up tightly with new products of research. Our national security is almost wholly dependent upon them. The books and journals of the day are preoccupied with the political and ethical consequences of an expanding wealth of power through technology. Even art and architecture are affected by the new ideas and new materials that flow from scientific and technical progress. These are the conditions that exist and we had best learn to live with them.

After all, if we are to contribute constructively to the preservation of peace and the dignity of human existence, then we must be prepared to deal intelligently with the world as it is. If we are to be effective in life we must comprehend the great issues of *our* time and the forces that are shaping *our* destiny. While we may draw upon religion for codes of conduct and upon history for principles of action, every liberally educated man or woman must know something of the laws that govern our material universe.

This is not to ask that the doctor, the lawyer, or the banker should learn and retain the details of science. But it does seem to me vital that at some period every educated man and woman should have gained an insight of certain principles, certain methods, certain great modes of thinking that lie be-

neath all science. It is not necessary that a man be able to discuss the gravity of the fall-out problem in terms of roentgens. But it is important that he should have a feeling about how we have arrived where we are. He should have explored some science far enough to have gained confidence—confidence that in this great domain there are no mysteries accessible only to the few—confidence that he himself might have pursued science to its farthest frontiers. Out of such confidence and familiarity may develop judgment, an intuitive sense of the critical factors entering into great issues.

Out of confidence, too, and through this basic understanding must come freedom from the fear of science, the dispelling of that mistrust and dormant hostility that threatens to cut off the community of scientists and engineers from the general body of educated people.

This growing chasm in our culture has come about in part because educated men have failed to communicate adequately with one another. Too often the scientist and engineer have been content to lead parochial lives; too often they have been too little concerned that others should understand the meaning and implications of their work. But this spirit of separatism has arisen too because we live in an age, as one physicist has put it, “in which poets and historians and men of affairs are proud they wouldn’t begin to consider thinking about learning anything of science, regarding it as the far end of a tunnel too long for any wise man to put his head into.” Such a tunnel philosophy, which is more common than many suspect, should lie heavy on the conscience of American education.

We need desperately a new and healthy fusion of learning and knowledge in our American colleges—a fusion which the educational programs I have outlined in such sketchy

terms this evening could help achieve. Happily, I believe such programs are coming. Already we have taken steps to give science and engineering students more opportunities for study in the social sciences and the arts. Happily, some schools—and you may be proud that Rice is among them—are also wisely requiring that the liberal arts student acquire a basic understanding of mathematics and science. But such forward-looking programs as yours are still too few in number to give American education the significance and relevancy it needs to create a climate of mutual understanding and respect among educated men. Such a climate, and such a greater unity of purpose in our educational programs, can contribute immeasurably toward the attainment of our highest national aspirations. The challenge of attainment is yours.

Having presented this challenge to your future, may I close with a word of congratulations on what you have already accomplished. I am privileged to have had the opportunity to share in this joyous occasion with you. I wish you Godspeed.

J. A. STRATTON

THE LAND OF HEART'S DESIRE: "COLLEGE PREPARATION" AND COLLEGE ENGLISH*

A GOOD many years ago I had a course in the Bibliography of English Literature from that very great gentleman, the late Tom Peete Cross of King William County, Virginia, and the University of Chicago. In his first lecture Mr. Cross made a memorably wise and characteristically witty remark. "In order to take this course successfully," he said, "you should already have taken this course." I feel very much the same way today: in order to speak to you effectively on the integration of high school and college English, I should like first to have attended this present conference. Well, of course I did attend the morning session, and at one time I planned to insert at this point some complimentary statements about how much I had learned from those deliberations. However, as you will infer from the manuscript I hold, this address was prepared before the meeting. Once when I was serving in an administrative office at another university, during a period of leisure I dictated a personal letter to a high school principal conveying my regrets sprinkled with words of consolation for poor grades earned in our first examination period by certain freshman students in whom he had expressed a special interest. The letter, suitably postdated, was typed and stored away, and I give you my solemn word that in due time it was mailed unchanged after the examinations had actually been taken and the grades recorded. So you see that I am not above a bit of prophetic deception, but in this instance I think candor is the better part of discretion. Although I listened closely to

* An address delivered to the District I Workshop of the Committee on Integration of the Teaching of English in High Schools and Colleges, at the University of Houston, October 22, 1955.

what was said this morning, the few remarks I am about to make were meditated independently and in advance.

The integration of high school and college English is an *end* about which there is absolutely no disagreement on any side, no dispute that I have ever heard in the secondary school or the university, among parents, students, or the community. But the means—ay, there's the rub. It is a problem with which educators of all classes, kinds, and degrees have struggled manfully and sincerely; and what is the result? I will tell you: this meeting, in which we gaze on one another with wild surmise, while our hearts toll a heavy fear lest the struggle naught availeth.

Perhaps you will be even more apprehensive when I tell you that today I am going to be theoretical rather than practical in my approach to the problem. My motive is simple enough. Since before the memory of man, we teachers have dealt with the problem practically, or tried to do so; and we have failed. Unless theory point the way, we may wander in a maze of trial and error, lost forever.

At the outset I must state a perhaps unpalatable truth: It is impossible for the high schools to prepare the total population for the university, because *the university has nothing to do with the total population*. In consequence, the heart of our problem is the need to identify future matriculants, or potential matriculants, into higher education as early in their secondary schooling as possible. As usual, the solution is more easily stated than executed. I am told that a few years ago, in a city not far from where I stand, a dual program of college-preparatory and non-preparatory high school education was shipwrecked on the rock of snobbishness, manifested as a general parental unwillingness to permit

Johnny to take other than the supposedly more socially distinguished curriculum. I do not know the whole story, and I certainly would not presume to rebuke or instruct those who do; but my first thought is that any confusion of social with intellectual distinction would best be thwarted by attaching such pains and penalties to the preparatory course as would effectually discourage both slugs and butterflies. Ideally, the college-preparatory course should be analogous in the high school to what the premedical curriculum is in the college of liberal arts and sciences: it should be serious; it should be hard; and it should be easily abandoned, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in favor of a less rigorous program. Before raising your brows, please remember that I am talking theory, and as Tennyson said, "*I know my words are wild.*"

When I wish to shed light on the educational problems of our time I often try to catch a reflection from the brilliant gleams of Cardinal Newman. Speaking of his own time, he also spoke prophetically of ours when he said: "I will tell you . . . what has been the practical error . . . It has been the error of distracting and enfeebling the mind by an unmeaning profusion of subjects; of implying that a smattering in a dozen branches of study is not shallowness, which it really is, but enlargement, which it is not . . . All things now are to be learned at once, not first one thing, then another, not one well, but many badly. Learning is to be without exertion, without attention, without toil; without grounding, without advance, without finishing. . . . Wise men have lifted up their voices in vain; and, at length, lest their own institutions should be outshone and should disappear in the folly of the hour, they have been obliged, as far as they could with a good conscience, to humor a spirit

which they could not withstand, and make temporizing concessions at which they could not but inwardly smile."

It is important to keep in mind exactly what we are discussing. To the remarks just quoted, Newman added: "All I say is, call things by their right names, and do not confuse together ideas which are essentially different. A thorough knowledge of one science and a superficial acquaintance with many, are not the same thing . . . Recreations are not education; accomplishments are not education. . . . Education is a high word; it is the preparation for knowledge, and it is the imparting of knowledge in proportion to that preparation." He was talking, as you know, about "The Idea of a University"; and so am I, or more precisely about the university in relation to an efficient preparation for it. Nothing that I shall say today is to be taken as even in the remotest way bearing critically upon the non-college curriculum. If this were the proper place and occasion, I would, on the contrary, sing a paean in honor of many high schools which I have officially visited, and in which I have seen evidence of the most brilliantly successful instruction in cooking, dressmaking, room decoration, joinery, printing, and tonsure. I really have no significant ideas about the curriculum suited to children not destined for higher education, but such glimmers of ideas as I do have are entirely favorable to those kinds of practical training for average, normal life. The necessary equipment appears considerably more costly than algebra textbooks or Latin readers, but just the same I am inclined to think that it represents public money well spent. If it ever came to a direct vote, I should not hesitate to cast my ballot for the kitchens and barber shops and model bedrooms and all the rest. At the same time, I would hope that a class in Virgil elected by perhaps only a very few registrants would not be canceled as an undue drain on school funds.

Suppose we were able to identify and isolate genuine college material (oh, horrendous word) in time to treat it as such in a secondary program. We should then, at last, be able to abandon the irrational compromise by which at present we attempt to prepare such people, as we say, "for life" as well as for the university. The music teacher training a gifted pupil does not think in terms of "life" but of the conservatory, and I submit that the horizon of the preparatory school or preparatory curriculum is purely and simply the university. The implications of this rather obvious truth may not have been sufficiently pondered.

If I were the admissions officer of a university and could prescribe the ideal matriculant, what would be my specifications? He would not need to know many things, but only to know a few things extremely well. First of all, he would have such a thorough command of correctly written and spoken English that no formal instruction in composition (much less in spelling, punctuation, and the like) would be needed at the university. Knowing as I do by experience, some of it sad experience, how seldom this specification is met, I am of the opinion that most of the time in high school English will have to be given to the language skills. Under this heading, or closely related to it, is the need to make sure that no student—absolutely not one—is certified as ready for college if he is unable to read. For a quarter of a century I have taught college English, and my special administrative work during several years of that time brought me into close contact with those wrecks and shards of student life, the probationers and the failures. I will lay my hand to my heart and say that beyond all the medical, emotional, intellectual, family, and financial causes usually blamed for academic trouble there lurks the demon of non-reading, whose name is Legion. His victim may be the dullard who

belongs elsewhere than in college, but he may equally be the quick-witted student whose native ingenuity has enabled him to idle through high school without reading or learning to read. Unfortunately, the non-reader usually does not know his own plight, for he imagines that if he is physically able to run his eyes across twenty pages he has read a twenty-page lesson. His sense of inadequacy is more likely to be the fear that he does not drive his eyes fast enough in this ritualistic scanning, and so he may fall victim to quacks with their mechanical reading devices. He will be saved, if ever, only by the discovery that reading means the groping and grappling and grasping of one mind for another mind through a symbolic wall of words, a process that is often slow and even when fast cannot be performed to the beat of a metronome.

Clearly, the more the high school English department devotes its time to the techniques of composition and reading, the less the proportion that will be available for literary study. I take comfort from an observation that lingers in my memory from an otherwise forgotten course in that curious discipline called Education. Speaking of the appropriate materials of the fifth grade, the sixth, and so on, the professor snarled (he had the habit of growling and snarling in place of lecturing): "*Save* something!" It was good advice: we teachers are all prone to forget that our victims will continue learning after they have escaped our clutches, and that the paradoxical secret of integration is division, even specialization.

Beyond command of the native tongue, I would expect a really firm grasp of another language. I should be inclined to specify Latin, for many reasons that I need not elaborate before this audience. Needless to say, there is no harm in

more than one language; but there is always harm when a potpourri of credits is offered in substitution for mastery of a single subject, and I believe this mischief is especially rife in the field of foreign languages. I certainly should prefer four years of Latin to, say, two of French and two of Spanish—or even to two of French and two of Latin, though the latter combination is not altogether inadvisable.

Next I would list real command of the principles and techniques of algebra, geometry, and trigonometry. Here I touch upon a sensitive nerve, for the Rice Institute has spent over forty years trying to persuade the high schools to send its students solidly grounded in the elements of mathematics. I daresay that Rice is the only university within hundreds, possibly thousands, of miles that requires of its freshmen a genuine course in college mathematics—that is, calculus and analytical geometry—in place of the bogus so-called college (actually elementary) algebra generally offered but seldom required except of technical majors. And what is the consequence? Every September most of our incoming freshmen voluntarily arrive on campus ahead of the official opening of the session, to be first reviewed or instructed in basic mathematics by the Institute's own teaching staff before being turned over to the Dean of Students, the Student Council, and those merry men, the sophomores, for the more ordinary kinds of orientation.

English language, foreign language, mathematics; what else? Opinion might differ, but I would strongly urge a long, comprehensive program of historical study—ancient, medieval, general modern, and American—as an essential background for a university career. Everything that happens or ever has happened is history, and I think there is no better mental frame for the organization of knowledge than the

formal study of history *as* history. We have all had in our classes the student who thought that Shakespeare flourished immediately after Chaucer because their names were not far separated in the textbook. I for one despair of the college student who speaks of Wordsworth as living in the "olden days" and writing "Old English," or who identifies 1492 as a date in the fourteenth century. Nor am I hopeful of one who seems never to relate Newton or Faraday or Copernicus or Lavoisier to any events, literary or historical, outside the realm of science.

And so, by a nimble transition, we come to the question of science in the college-preparatory program. Here I willingly confess (to my shame, not credit) that I am out of my element. Two opinions I will venture: one dogmatically and the other hesitantly. The first is that mathematics is infinitely more important than natural science as a basis for college work, and that if for any reason one or the other has to be slighted, it should be the latter. My second, and more tentative, opinion is that high school is the place for a descriptive, general, and synthetic study. I know that "general science" is a despised term, probably because the subject has been taught in a despicable manner. But I come back to that useful rule of education that was snarled at me in my student days: "*Save something!*" The intensive, systematic investigation of the individual sciences can, I think, wait upon the college or university. Yet one would like to be able to count upon matriculants who have a general view of the physical universe, from the subatomic particles to the spiral nebulae, and in particular of the earth with its life including man, reasonably in accord with the closer view of certain of these areas that will be appropriate to his later studies. More especially, one would hope that the student will enter col-

lege with some real grasp of the aims, attitudes, procedures, and self-imposed limitations of scientists—in short, of the scientific method. It is at least pathetic, and may be tragic, when a college man or woman imagines that Newton achieved intellectual supremacy by noticing for the first time that fruit may fall upon the head of an idler under the old apple tree, and imagines that Darwin shamefully populated another tree, the family tree of man, with rhesus monkeys and orangoutangs.

You see that I have cast my net far, instead of confining myself solely to the special question of this conference: the integration of high school and college English. For that problem is part of the whole question of the general integration of school and college. I have—arbitrarily, I well know—assumed that the potential or the certain college matriculant can somehow be identified early in life, and I have attempted to state those programs of secondary study that might best prepare him for work in almost any branch of liberal, technical, or scientific learning. So far as English is concerned, it follows from what I have advocated that he might reach the university ignorant or largely ignorant of *Beowulf*, *The Canterbury Tales*, and *Paradise Lost*; even Shakespeare might be little more than the echo of a name. If the preparatory courses are primarily devoted to composition and reading as skills, the study of literature becomes not only secondary but, almost inevitably, functional. Looked upon as a source of ideas or a model of style for high school themes, Milton, for example, hardly towers large. Neither, I think, do Sir Walter Scott, James Fenimore Cooper, and others I refrain from mentioning for fear of recrimination. Before the secondary teachers in our midst set me down as a raving madman, let me beg them to ask themselves two questions: When

you were in high school, was your own impression of, let us say, *The Lady of the Lake* and *Silas Marner* one of delighted discovery of literary value or one of distaste? Second, in your own teaching, do you feel a sense of achievement or, instead, of an assigned task dutifully performed when you have explained the mythology, figures of speech, and structural symmetry of "L'Allegro" and "Il Penseroso"? Add a third and a fourth question, if you will: Have you observed any effect, beneficial or otherwise, of these texts on the style of composition of your students? And when you assign a theme upon them, does the subject matter seem to have penetrated to the hearts of your young writers and genuinely affected their thoughts or habits of thought? I have an idea that your answers may be a little different if you have been having them read, for example, Thomas Henry Huxley—or, for that matter, either of his grandsons, Aldous or Julian. Without in any way implying a judgment of relative literary value, I will say that my personal education would have been less bungled and delayed if instead of *The Last of the Mohicans* the syllabus in literature had called for *Tono-Bungay* or *Main Street*.

No doubt you observe that I seemingly recommend for high schools mainly the use of selections in prose. Frankly, I do—on the principle, once again, of saving something for the university; let Austin have its swink to it reserved. Still, a suitable introduction to the pleasures and techniques of verse obviously is appropriate—I am inclined to say essential—to the preparatory course. I certainly am not trying to write the secondary curriculum in detail across this table, and so I will only suggest that the rich variety of poetry in the English language makes shameful the choice of poems that might tend to give children in their middle teens an

impression that verse is an arcanum or an affliction. A bit of Poe for mystery and romance, a bit of Tennyson for metrical and verbal delight, and a bit of Whitman (carefully selected) for democratic, patriotic fervor might be a pretty firm core for further reading and appreciation of poetry in more mature years.

By the same token that I would specialize the preparatory program in English largely upon composition, I would specialize that of the colleges upon literature, viewed historically, internationally, and in its various forms and genres. I wonder whether it has begun to occur to you that if this division of functions were accomplished, in the long run college English might tend to lose its position as a required subject in the curriculum. Now, you see, I also wring the withers of my university colleagues. However, anyone who has thoughtfully observed students, often indeed the same students, in courses they have been required to take and those they have freely elected will perhaps decline to weep. I have never heard of English I winning any popularity contests.

With the abandon of the theorist, I have so far neglected a crucial question: What happens to the student who elects the college-preparatory course but in the end does not go to college, or on the other hand to the student who fails to choose it and later finds his means and inclination to lie in that direction? The first class does not trouble me; if we have any faith at all in what is called liberal education, it is hardly consistent with that faith to suggest that a boy or girl thoroughly and successfully educated in the use of his native tongue as a medium of reading and self-expression, in mathematics and the scientific method, in a foreign language with a sampling of its literature, and in world and American

history will be an unhappy or misfit citizen. If he can learn all that, he probably can learn a trade without difficulty.

The other group are our real problem children, and I cannot arrange any easy rescue for them from their own mistake or that of their parents or counselors. Clearly, the rescue must be effected by postgraduate high school or sub-college instruction of some type, and I have an idea that the best agency of mercy will prove to be the junior college. Let me say that I have the greatest and most genuine respect for the municipal, district, and consolidated junior colleges whose advent has been such a prominent educational feature of our generation. Apparently their resources, patience, and ingenuity are inexhaustible. They seem eager and able to make themselves all things to all the men, women, and children of their constituency. Their registrars dexterously arrange fantastic schedules for days, nights, and Saturdays that rival in complexity the astronomical tables. Their deans conjure apparently out of the whirlwind qualified instructors for dozens of unexpected, unscheduled sections of English and mathematics, as well as the specialists to fill unheard-of demands for courses in igneous petrology, motel management, or celloidin-section techniques. Their presidents hold in an impossible balance of good will the irreconcilable educational and civic interests of the community. Their boards of control wring from the tax rolls funds for acres of shops and laboratories, auditoriums seating half a city, and fleets of busses that twice daily move the student population of whole counties. There is nothing these institutions seem reluctant to undertake, and so with some confidence I fling upon their broad backs the problem of the aspiring college student who has not prepared himself for college. I might illustrate by mentioning the fact that appli-

cants for admission to the Rice Institute are sometimes advised to spend a year of additional preparation on another campus. I refer, of course, not to straight transfers into sophomore standing, but to students who deliberately improve their preparation for entrance as freshmen by an extra year concentrated upon mathematics, English, foreign language, science, or whatever combination of subjects seems needed. The results are—as one might expect—almost uniformly good, and I cannot recall that I have often heard any foolish talk about a “lost” year on the part of students or their parents after the benefits of that program have become evident.

Ladies and Gentlemen, you have been very kind to invite and hear me as a speaker before this conference. I have brought you no special insights, no experimental data, no pat formulas for solving the problem you are so gallantly confronting with your collective will and intelligence. It is a problem on which I have brooded privately since first I began to teach. Today I have told you a few things I have long been thinking; and as I have put them into consecutive words, in the main for the first time, I have been aware of how far from practical reality I must appear to some of you to have wandered. Ours is the age of mass-everything, including mass education, and yet here (without actually employing the expression) I have been talking of an aristocracy of intellect. Well, where else is the problem? If the high schools are concerned with very nearly the whole population, and if the university takes up that same burden, it will perforce take it up where they have set it down; there will be no more discontinuity than between the sixth and seventh grades or between the ninth and the tenth—which is to say,

essentially none at all. The supposed difficulty becomes, then, hardly more than a mote in the eye of university idealists reluctant to confess their actual position as the teachers of grades thirteen through sixteen. If, on the other hand, we conceive of the university as a radically different order of institution, bearing, as I have already suggested, a relation to the high school analogous to that of the medical college with respect to the college of arts and sciences, then the problem takes on the validity and urgency implied by the kind of meeting we are having today. May our deliberations be blessed with wise and fruitful issue.

J. D. THOMAS

THE TREATMENT OF TROUBLESOME BEHAVIOR IN AMERICA*

I FIRST became interested in writing a paper along the lines of this present one when, some year and a half ago, I began to read and to hear statements about the percentage cures of the "mentally ill" we could expect if we would establish the "proper facilities." The figures given (80% was the usual figure, although I recently heard one of our gubernatorial candidates say that he was assured by his advisers that 90% of the patients at the State Hospitals could be returned to productive life if treatments were started early enough)—these figures, then, reminded me of that phase of psychiatric history called the "Cult of Curability" which started in the early 1800's and culminated in the late 1840's with at least one claim of 100% cure for all discharged patients. The "Cult of Curability" had about run its course by 1855.

Struck by what appeared to be a cycle, and somewhat in a skeptical frame of mind (to be honest about it), I began then to examine whatever recent statistical statements of cures and recoveries I could come upon, more with the end in view of examining the nature of the statistical methods and manipulations than of examining the conclusions. I then became interested in what might be called a history of medical statistics, but soon found, not unexpectedly, that the statistics were inextricably bound up with the views of the nature of man and his ills that were prevailing at the time the statistics were gathered. At that time, I began reading and collecting material for what was to be this paper, then tentatively entitled, "The Treatment of the

* A paper presented to the Historical Society of the Rice Institute, October 11, 1956.

'Mentally Ill' in America." Since then, the venture has changed and grown so as to be almost unrecognizable.

As I read, I began to see that, around 1870, the distinguishing line between "criminal" and "mentally ill," never really clear, was being smudged to a state of grayness. A similar smudging of the line between juvenile delinquency and mental illness was practically complete by 1910; of the line between what might best be called the poor and obstreperous and the mentally ill by 1900; and, with the widening acceptance of psychoanalytic theory in America, of the line between the normal and the mentally ill by 1920. Thus, to talk of "treatment" would require me to report on the sentencing practices of the judiciary, forensic psychiatry, the sentencing of juvenile offenders, and the practices of social agencies, as well as on the main stream of psychiatric treatments. I found, in fact, that I was reading and thinking about what might best be called "The Treatment of Troublesome Behavior in America" and it is on some small aspect of this that I want to report.

First of all, am I justified in using the term "troublesome behaviors," which is so ill-definedly evocative as to summon forth almost any definition the listener chooses, from the troubles caused us by teething babes to growing worries over what to do about our aged? Can and may I take such a meaningless term and by imparting my own meaning to it, foist it off on you as worth your notice? I am not certain, but I intend to try. I will attempt to make the term meaningful by pointing out that only some behaviors have been deemed interfering or troublesome enough to have been dignified to the point of having massive social institutions specifically designed to handle them. I am saying, then, that these are not my own meanings, but the meanings of a

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social consensus—a cowardly way out but, I think, a fruitful one.

What do I think these behaviors, and their attendant institutions, are? Generally, the behaviors are offenses against, that is behaviors contrary to, our notions concerning property, person, or propriety. At present, we have five functioning social institutions, and one growing one, to handle these offenses, depending on our views as to whether the cause of the offense was criminality, immaturity, insanity, imbecility, poverty, or senility. For offenses purported to be criminal in cause, we have penology and, to some degree, the law; for immaturity, juvenile penology and, to some degree, the law; for insanity, psychiatry and, to some degree, the law; for imbecility, education and, to some degree, the law; for poverty, social service and, to some degree, the law; and for senility, the growing field of geriatrics which has as yet little to do with the law except in those instances where senility is complicated with offenses of criminality, insanity, or poverty.

The history of the treatment of offenders against property, person, or propriety in America is an interesting one. During the earlier periods of our national history little distinction was made, by way of treatment, between the pauper, the criminal, the insane, and the youthful offender. By and large, they were all treated by incarceration in the workhouse or poorhouse or house of correction, usually one and the same building. As an example of "prescientific" occupational therapy, they were auctioned off to the low bidder under the "New England System" or to the high bidder under the "lease system."¹ However, from the late 1700's on until the late 1800's there was a gradual trend toward segregation of the various classes of offenders. Some

parts of the country had begun this while still colonies. Thus, the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1752 set up a temporary hospital for "the Relief of the Sick Poor of this Province, and for the Reception and Cure of Lunaticks."² The establishment of such facilities for the various classes of offenders being an economic burden on either the municipality, county, or state, such a trend was slow in developing and made headway only after what might be called clear distinctions were established between the criminal, the immature, the insane, and the pauper. These distinctions were based on the purported causes mentioned earlier, that is, offenses against property, person, or propriety were seen as due either to criminal tendencies, immaturity, insanity, or poverty, and the social institutions that grew to handle them persist today.

What makes this history particularly interesting is the fact that the distinctions had no sooner been made than the distinguishing lines became smudged. A clear example of what I mean by smudging of lines of distinction is that of the treatment of the juvenile offender. For some period of time there had been agitation to treat the juvenile offender differently from the adult criminal, partly, it was said, to prevent the contamination of youth by adults in a common jail, but also because it was felt that different factors were operating to produce the offenses of youth than were operative with adult offenders. This agitation had its end in the establishment of a separate court for juveniles in Chicago in 1899, but in 1909, just ten years after this distinction had been made, the Chicago Juvenile *Psychopathic* (I emphasize that word) Institute was founded in conjunction with the Juvenile Court.³ By 1915, Dr. Healy had published his famous book, *The Individual Delinquent*,⁴ in which he ad-

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vanced the thesis that juvenile offenders were mentally ill; not insane in the legal sense, but mentally ill in the psychiatric sense. A short period of independence for the juvenile offender, indeed.

Similar smudging tended to wipe out other lines so hardly drawn just a short time before. Whereas Dr. John P. Gray was able, with conscience, to say in 1872 that the causes of insanity "as far as we are able to determine, are physical; that is, no moral or intellectual operations of the mind induce insanity apart from a physical lesion,"⁵ in 1904, Dr. Adolf Meyer used his wife to visit the families of patients (a social case work task) because "we thus obtained help in a broader social understanding of our problem and a reaching out to the *sources* of sickness, the family and the community."⁶ If psychiatry enlisted social work, so also, but belatedly, did social work enlist psychiatry. The science of penology early in the 1900's established "psychopathic laboratories" for "individual psychopathic examination for classification,"⁷ and, a few years later, brought in the social case worker especially in probation work.

These are but a few examples of the overlapping of formerly separate social "treatment" institutions. I do not present these examples to point up the continuing argument as to the *sources* of troublesome behavior, I present them to point up the fact that lines of distinction thought clear in the late 1800's are no longer clear in the 1900's.

This, then, is the background as I see it. In the America of the 1700's, by and large, offenders against property, person, and propriety were treated in much the same way even though there might have been recognition of distinctions between causes. In the America of the 1800's, the distinctions between causes were emphasized and separate

social institutions to treat the classified offenders grew. In America at 1900, the institutions were relatively separate but the distinctions between kinds of causes were relatively blurred.

My thesis is this: The history of treatment of troublesome behaviors in America since 1900 is a history of progressive slurring over of lines of institutional specialization. It is with the nature of this slurring that the body of this paper is concerned. What I am attempting to do is take up separately the treatment institutions of penology, psychiatry, social work, and what, for lack of a commonly used term, I shall call juvenile penology, to trace not only the intermingling of the institutions but also the specific ways in which the intermingling has been achieved. I want to report rather fully on penology and but indicate the trends in social work.

Turning, then, to the treatment institution of penology, perhaps I can find no better way of starting than by quoting at some length from the 1917 "Report of the Committee on Criminal Law Reform" of the American Prison Association:

As Blackstone (Commentaries V.4, Ch.1, Sec.2) puts it, "the end or final cause of human punishment is not by way of atonement or expiation for the crime committed, for that must be left to the just determination of the Supreme Being, but as a precaution against future offenses of the same kind. This is effected three ways: either by the amendment of the offender himself; . . . or, by deterring others by the dread of his example from offending in the like way; . . . or, by depriving the party injuring of the power to do further mischief."

We are apt to swing from one extreme to another in the position we take on any question. The solution of the problem is usually found somewhere between the two extremes. For years we have sought to attain the end of human punishment by adopting the last two methods suggested, and have given little consideration to the amendment of the offender himself. Suddenly we have come to the realization of the futility of

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success in eliminating the reformation of the criminal as a means of attaining the end which we seek. Formerly, the sole consideration was given to the punishment inflicted. Now we seem to consider the criminal and to disregard the crime. Somewhere between these two extremes must be found the proper method to adopt in order to protect society.⁸

The report then goes on to recommend the abolition of the fee system, the use of prison labor by the state, the use of the indeterminate sentence, and speedy trials. There are two points in the quotation I want to bring to your attention. First, reformation of the offender is recommended as a protection for society, not for the health and happiness of the offender. Second, the thought is expressed that, at that time, an extreme position was being held, an extreme position in consideration of the criminal and disregard of the crime. I want to discuss this second point more fully. In what ways were the penologists doing the extreme? One might think that this plaint has a familiar ring; that it calls to mind present-day protests against the apparent absolving the criminal of responsibility for his acts by the psychiatrist, psychologist, and social worker. But, on searching the reports in the *Proceedings* prior to and for some time after 1917, one can find almost no social work contribution to treatment methods and very few from psychiatry or psychology, and these in the nature of, if you will, scientific recommendations, not practices. The nature of extreme position that was being protested against had to do with self-government, and with the honor system as one form of it.

The attempted use of some form of self-government has a long history in American prisons. At the first meeting of the American Prison Association in 1870, a statement of the principles which should govern prison administrators was drawn up. One of "The Principles of 1870" states: "The

prisoner's destiny should be placed, measurably, in his own hands; he must be put into circumstances where he will be able, through his own exertions, to continually better his own condition. A regular self interest must be brought into play, and made constantly operative."⁹ The logic underlying the idea of controlling prisoners by appealing to their "self interest" gradually gave way to a logic based on the thesis that prisoners were "persons who have never properly learned the lessons of self control so essential to good citizenship,"¹⁰ and, from 1915 on through 1918-19, still appealing to "The Principles of 1870" for justification, the "amendment" of prisoners was sought through attempts to inculcate in them this lacking self-control by offering them opportunities to practice it under self-government and the honor system. By 1915 a surprisingly large number of prisons were using some form of this treatment. Gradually, starting about the same time (1915), for no dramatic reason that I can determine, there began to be protests against the honor system. I can find no instances cited of large-scale defections under the honor system, nor other than anecdotal instances of abuse under self-government, but, by 1918, it seemed generally accepted that, although these systems could be efficient and relatively pleasant, they did not amend the prisoner with regard to increasing his self-control. The systems were maintained and are still widely used, but by 1917-18, other methods for inculcating self-control were being sought. Self-control was still the desideratum—the method of achieving it debatable.

It is, perhaps, no coincidence that, in the 1917 *Proceedings*, there is an article by Guy D. Fernald, M.D., Resident Physician, Massachusetts Reformatory, entitled "The Psychopathic Laboratory in Criminology."¹¹ This was not the first

article by a resident physician, nor was it the first to mention psychopathy in relation to prisoners. What makes this article noteworthy to me is that it is the first one in these *Proceedings* to venture the use of a physician in the treatment of *all* prisoners rather than just those held to be mentally ill. In this article, classification was certainly secondary to treatment. Let me quote: "The concept of a prison, house of correction or reformatory as a place of reformation is an erroneous one, whether held by the prisoner or by those in authority over him. The ideal reformatory is in fact a good place for one who should reform, just as a preparatory school is a good place for one seeking college training."¹² He goes on to say that prisoners and authorities make a vital mistake in assuming that "good intentions" are enough. The prisoner must have a plan for the future and "a determination involving self-denial becomes a prerequisite to success."¹³ It is with this plan and the acquisition of self-denial that the medico-psychologist (to use Dr. Fernald's term) should be concerned. "The prison physician may convey vastly more of benefit to his charges in one hour by his advice and prescriptions of moral and intellectual calisthenics based on their mental needs as ascertained by the analysis and friendly inductive reasoning of the psychopathic interview than by ministering to them in the hospital for days."¹⁴

This, to change my metaphor, was the breaching of the institutional walls of penology (whether the first in point of time, I cannot say for certain). No longer were the criminal and the insane criminal, or the insane and the non-insane, to be treated differently, but all were to be treated by means of the psychopathic interview. I cannot truthfully say that this breaching was widely acclaimed by the wardens; nor can I say that all wardens went immediately

out to dicker with psychiatrists, but rapidly, relative to changes in many other social institutions, psychiatry with its attendant modes of thought and investigation—with its ideology—became an integral part of our penological system. The impact of this ideology as well as the misunderstanding of it was so great that, by 1926, Dr. William A. White felt called upon, while addressing the Prison Association members, to point out that the psychiatrists really didn't want to run the prisons and were not ideologically committed to the point of view that prisoners should early be released. He pointed out that the inmates of the prison attached to his hospital remained two and one half times as long as they would have if they had been sentenced to the usual prison and discharged at the expiration of their sentences. "In other words, the psychiatrist far from being a sentimentalist protects society, if he is given the right to do it, better than the law with its definite sentence."¹⁵

Perhaps, in these last few points, I have strayed too far from Dr. Fernald's paper. It is important in that it contains the paradigm for the breaching of all institutions by each other. Oversimply put, this paradigm is one of generalization of a method of approach (usually justified by being termed scientific) held to be successful (correctly or incorrectly) with one class of behavior to behaviors of a different class. It is not that Dr. Fernald held that all criminals are psychopathic (in fact, he stressed those things "the offender has in common with all thinking beings");¹⁶ rather, he held that the *method* of treatment should override any apparent differences in classes of behavior. Dr. Fernald entered the institution through that part of the wall labelled "self-control—self-indulgence." He might well have entered other parts—inherited tendencies, instinctive impulses, economic

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pressures, etc. The point is, he was not challenging imputed causes but, to put it bluntly, offering a panacea.

This, in essence, is the nature of the change that I see as having taken place in treatment institutions since 1900. Let it not be thought that this is intended as an indictment of psychiatry, although that institution has been dragged, unwillingly at times, and has pushed its way, unwillingly at times, into more behavioral areas than any other institution but education. Had I started with social work rather than penology, the paradigm would have been found in the way in which penological considerations in the sense of control, discipline, and legal restrictions made their entrance early, and psychiatry not until the late 1920's.

But I have presented my point, and with it in mind, I would like to return to a further consideration of penology. Since, except in those states which allow the use of an indeterminate, or indefinite, sentence, the law through the judge is actually the prescriber of the treatment, wardens have felt (and expressed their feelings) that this externally applied prescription unnaturally limited the effectiveness of their treatment techniques. It was felt that treatment could be bettered should the time of release be somehow correlated with response to treatment—in other words, time off for good behavior was felt desirable. It was in this sense that parole was used during the early part of the present century.¹⁷ Parole and its fellow, probation, formed the twin gaps in the walls of penology through which social work crept. Before 1917, the social workers were remarkably silent, if the pages of the *Proceedings* are accurate representations. They were certainly in the prisons, but they were primarily investigators, reporting back to the warden, or the chaplain, or the physician depending on the institutional

organization. Their place, or lack of it, in 1917 is indicated by the list of prison officials called upon to make reports to parole boards in New York: "the warden, keeper, industrial agent, chaplain and prison physician."¹⁸ Their place, or lack of it, is further indicated by "the things paid attention to when granting parole,"¹⁹ i.e., the prisoner's mental and physical condition.

In 1918 and 1919, social workers were more voluble, but their contributions had to do with wayward girls in wartime, the effects of war on the economic welfare of the families of prisoners, and similar items. Even then they did not seem to be accorded much status by the Prisoners Aid Society. By 1926, social workers were being listed prominently in lists of personnel needs but they had still not broken into print on treatment. However, in 1928, Mr. C. L. Chute, General Secretary of the National Probation Association, emphasized the need for methods to individualize the treatment of prisoners, suggesting that parole tended to fail because of the lack of such treatment in the prisons. He pointed out four trends in prison work he felt to be most promising, among them being "a methodology of case treatment . . . that, we believe, will produce effective results, both in individual reclamation and in community protection."²⁰ (Note which treatment goal is presented first.) From then on, the breach was rapidly widened. By 1931, we begin to find specific recommendations for properly administered "efforts to improve the physical and moral condition in the prisons and alleviate to some extent the situation of the released prisoner brought about by the rigid attitude of society toward those who had committed offenses."²¹ (Note the reversed direction of the protective urge.) By 1935, we find such titles as "Principles and Methods of Individualized Penal Treatment,"

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"Classification through Case Work as a Basis for Administration of Correctional Institutions in a State Wide System," and "The Practical Value of the Case Work Program."²² In fact, we find a section of the meeting and report devoted exclusively to case work as a method of treatment, completely separate from the sections on probation and on parole. Social work had entered, with its method of approach, and it, also, came in to handle the "lack of moral and social responsibility" of the prisoner. That social workers' expectations for their method were more restrained than those of Dr. Fernald some twenty years earlier might well be due to modesty or to more experience with the results of "scientific methods" in the handling of people, prisoners or not. In any event, in the article "Classification through Case Work . . .," Mr. Ellis felt called upon to caution his listeners by referring to some statements of Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck.

Only the enthusiastic amateur will fail to admit that psychiatry and psychology as well as social case-work still have considerable to learn and perhaps more to unlearn, not only as regards diagnosis of the individual and intelligent classification based thereon, but also and particularly with respect to therapy. As to this, Dr. Cabot's position is unquestionably unshakable. But if representatives of these arts and aspiring sciences do not experiment with methods of personality study and reorientation, who will? The point is that here are social servants whose specialty is just the one we are concerned with. The penal institutions offer an excellent field for young psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and clergymen who are not merely content to act as white collar keepers of our penal zoos, but who see the need of experimenting with various ways of "helping people out of their trouble." Some means must be found to attract earnest and capable workers to this much-neglected missionary field at our very door.²³

Certainly a restrained and, if you will, a quite modern approach. Note, however, that while representatives of three

of our treatment institutions are mentioned (psychiatrist, social worker, and keeper), one of them, the keeper, is mentioned disparagingly as though his treatment contributions were nil. This, I think, is a reflection of the fact that these breachings were not unresisted and that bad feelings arose between members of the various treatment institutions. As I mentioned before, Dr. White in 1926 felt it necessary to try to allay some of this resistance and these feelings. Various articles by wardens scattered throughout the *Proceedings*, from 1910 on, hinted at unrest among them, but concerted overt resistance by the wardens against the invasion of their treatment institution by other institutions did not begin to be shown until after the fourth of the institutions, education, had breached the penological walls and it is to that breaching I now turn.

Essentially, what early distinguished penology from juvenile penology was the use by the latter of separate courts and a greater reliance on probation. However, starting about 1914 (all of my dates, I should have said sooner, give a specious air of exact dating to trends that were gradual and cumulative), the treatment institution of education invaded juvenile penology and, for years, remained the favored treatment method. It was through this breach in the wall of an attached institution that education invaded penology. By 1931, the penological term "Industrial Education" had largely been replaced by the juvenile penological equivalent "Vocational Education." This had not gone much further by 1935, except for the establishment of a section on Education at the meetings, which had but one contribution, a paper on "Vocational Training."²⁴ Education, establishing this breach late, made up for its tardiness by a whirlwind campaign and, in 1938, established itself firmly not only in vocational and

remedial education but in "the development and training of the whole human being for complete living,"²⁵ and by 1953, "the development of programs designed to readjust maladjusted personalities"²⁶ was the major objective. Some representative "social education" programs of this period are "Personal Advancement," "Adopting Proper Attitudes, Mental Hygiene, Relationship with Others," "Life Adjustment," and others.²⁷ Again this was invasion through method, for it was not claimed that the majority, or even a large number of prisoners, were offenders *because* of lack of education, only that education was a good treatment method.

It should be said that education, while not so brash as early psychiatry, was not as modest as later social work. Let me quote from the statute of New York State which created the office of Director of Education under the Commissioner of Correction:

The objective of prison education in its broadest sense should be the socialization of the individual through varied impressional and expressional activities, with emphasis on individual inmate needs. The objective of this program shall be the return of these inmates to society with a more wholesome attitude toward living, with a desire to conduct themselves as good citizens and with the skill and knowledge which will give them a reasonable chance to maintain themselves and their dependents through honest labor. To this end each prisoner shall be given a program of education which, on the basis of available data, seems most likely to further the process of socialization and rehabilitation. The time devoted daily to such education shall be such as is required for meeting the above objectives.²⁸

This relative lack of modesty might have resulted from the fact that the commission writing this statute had sought and received "financial aid of Foundations"²⁹ and thus felt under pressure to deliver.

What is noteworthy about this statute, in addition to

specifying that "*each prisoner* shall be given a program of education," is the specification of time. The time element is a common feature of all officially determined prisoner education movements. I have no idea whether it was actually the time factor, as the wardens claim, or whether the wardens, seeing this additional treatment claim, could brook no more and chose to revolt at the newest and, hence, least well established invader, but, in any event, from about the late 1930's, again and again one could read the complaints of the wardens. The burden of these complaints, plaintively put, was, "Am I the head of this prison or am I not?" Although often in these articles the warden would snipe at the psychiatrist, the social worker, and the poor, overworked, maligned psychologist, the primary target was the education man. This still goes on today, and one of the most amusing articles in the 1952 *Proceedings* was one entitled "Areas of Agreement and Disagreement between Correctional Educators and Wardens."³⁰ In this, the warden, Garrett Heyns, is deriding the uncritical establishment of similar educational programs in all prisons, no matter what the nature of the institution. It is his contention that educational programs are now customary and "every warden must have one, lest he be considered an old fogey,"³¹ and the ambitiousness of educators leads to the misuse of education.

I have described at some length, although, truly, with insufficient detail, the changes that have taken place in penology. I would like to describe what has happened in social work, psychiatry, and juvenile penology but am not yet prepared, even should I have the time and you the patience. Let me, however, just sketch in the changes in social work so that you will see the trends. To do this, I shall quote from the Presidential address to the National

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Conference of Social Work in 1926, making my points concerning the changes by parenthetically commenting on the presidential words:

Times have changed so rapidly that a whole revolution of thought in social work has taken place since the first meeting in 1880 and even since the second in 1912 [the emergence of the social institution]. As Judge Mack pointed out in his presidential address in 1912, the emphasis in 1880 was upon *alleviation* of distress, *correction* of wrongdoing [the original treatment methods]. In 1912 it was upon prevention [the intrusion of some methods of juvenile penology]. . . . And yet another note was beginning to be heard. President Mack said: "For some years we have been passing beyond the age of mere preventive work. The eradication of evil is not enough—constructive philanthropy demands that it be replaced by the positive good."³²

And to what did social work turn for the implementation of "the positive good"? To psychiatry, as indicated by the conference of 1919, where "mental hygiene and psychiatry swept the conference,"³³ with the subsequent establishment of the field of psychiatric social work.

I realize that these brief allusions to a field as wide and complex as social work convey little and demonstrate almost nothing. I append them to the report on penology only to suggest to you that changes have taken place in fields other than penology and to lead to my conclusion.

Not all treatment areas are in the same stage of development, but the following is generally true. Following the invasion of one treatment institution by another, there would be a period of development of specialties within specialties within the specialized invading institution. Then there would be a period of disillusionment and criticism—self and other—and the invading institution would remain as an integral part of the invaded institution, but in a less flamboyant role. Its early role would be taken up by another, newcom-

ing invader which would repeat the cycle. This cycle of invasion, overspecialization, assimilation is, at the present time, being replaced by what is termed the "multidisciplinary approach." An example of this approach in the institution of penology is the classification board which sees each prisoner and, as a board, plans his treatment. Such boards are usually made up of specialists from the institutions of penology, psychiatry, social work, and education; and the members attempt to comprehend the person before them by means of their multidisciplines.

It is my feeling that, although the multidisciplinary approach is an improvement over the extreme specialization it replaced, it is still inadequate. Each discipline defines the troublesome behavior being treated in terms of its own logic and ideology, and we have not a unitary behavior even though but one person is being treated, but as many troublesome behaviors as there are disciplines treating. Like the blind men with the elephant, the multidisciplinary approach awaits the development of a *unified* and *unifying* description of troublesome behavior. It may well be that such a description will be a consequent of the multidisciplinary approach of the future.

Some of you may wonder "But what about the results? What about the comparative successes of all of these treatment methods?" Well, the answer to that depends upon statistics—and everyone knows how they are.

TRENTON WILLIAM WANN

NOTES

1. Albert Deutsch, *The Mentally Ill in America* (New York, 1949), pp. 117 ff.
2. Deutsch, p. 59.
3. William Healy, "Thoughts about Juvenile Courts," *Federal Probation*, XIII (Sept., 1949), 16.

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4. William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent* (Boston, 1915).
5. Deutsch, p. 284.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 287.
7. Guy G. Fernald, "The Psychopathic Laboratory in Criminology," *Proceedings of the Annual Congress of the American Prison Association* (1917), p. 209.
8. Edward D. Duffield, "Report of the Committee on Criminal Law Reform," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1917), pp. 48-49.
9. Joseph W. Sanford, "The Honor System," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1938), p. 65.
10. John L. Whitman, discussion, *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1917), p. 181.
11. Fernald, *op. cit.*, p. 208.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 209.
15. William A. White, "Psychiatry as an Element in Protective Penology," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1926), p. 223.
16. Fernald, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
17. The legality of parole was hotly questioned for many years. Thomas C. O'Brien, "Judicial Decisions on Parole," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1920), p. 55, reports on some of the judicial decisions, one of which reads, in part, "A majority of us think the act is unconstitutional as interfering with the judgment of the judiciary. The whole judicial power of the common wealth is vested in its courts. The trial, conviction, and sentencing of criminals are judicial duties, and the duration of the sentence is an essential part of a judicial judgment in a criminal record. If the legislature may authorize boards of inspectors to disregard judicial sentences, why may they not repeal them as fast as they are pronounced, and thus assume the highest judicial functions?"
18. E. E. Larkin, discussion, *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1917), p. 233.
19. *Loc. cit.*
20. Charles G. Chute, "The Changing Status of Probation," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1928), p. 154.
21. Howard C. Hill, "Relationship of Prisoners Aid Associations to Police and Crime Detective Agencies," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1931), p. 49.
22. Edgar A. Doll, "Principles and Methods of Individualized Penal Treatment"; William J. Ellis, "Classification Through Case Work as a Basis for Administration of Correctional Institutions in a State Wide System"; E. Preston Sharp, "Practical Value of

- the Case Work Program," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1935), pp. 129-151.
23. Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor T. Glueck, *500 Criminal Careers* (New York, 1930), p. 319.
24. Roy W. Kenny, "Vocational Training," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1935), p. 161.
25. Thomas J. Hanlon, "The Deputy Warden's Contribution to Successful Management," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1938), p. 74.
26. Ralph H. Rosenberg, "Coordinating Industrial Rehabilitation with Education," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1953), p. 94.
27. Glenn M. Kendall, "Some Trends in Correctional Education," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1953), p. 95.
28. *The Ninety-Third Annual Report of the Prison Association of New York* (1937), p. 12.
29. William E. Grady, "Educating Prisoners," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1937), p. 178.
30. Garrett Heyns, "Areas of Agreement and Disagreement between Correctional Educators and Wardens," *Proceedings American Prison Association* (1952), p. 97.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
32. Gertrude Vaile, "Some Significant Trends since Cleveland, 1912," *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work* (1926), p. 3.
33. Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

